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FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET

MichaelJ. Kaufman*
John M Wunderlich"
ABSTRACT
As we have shown in a series of priorArticles, and as scholars have
acceptedsince, class actions are vital to protecting investors. Presumptions
of reliance facilitate class-wide resolution of securities fraud claims.
Without class certification, individual damages may be de minimis, and
thus investors would be unlikely to bring a securities fraud suit. This
underenforcement allows those who defraud investors to skate liability and
impugn the integrity of the marketplace. Under Rule 1Ob-5, for securities
fraud the Supreme Court has presumed reliance to facilitate class actions
where there is an omission in the face of a duty to disclose or where there
is a fraud on the secondary market. The new frontier is whether federal
courts should likewise presume reliancewhere fraud occurs on the primary
market, giving rise to the fraud-created-the-market theory. While some
federal courts embraced the theory decades ago, a sharp conflict has
arisen in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Stoneridge, and the
Third and Ninth Circuits have set the pace for rejecting the theory. In this
Article we show, however, that the fraud-created-the-market theory is
consistent with the fundamental basis for all presumptions in the law,
comports with the Supreme Court's interpretationsof the federal securities
laws as properly understood, and serves the investor-protection and
market-integrity design of securities regulation.
We undertake the seminal comprehensive definition and defense of the
fraud-created-the-markettheory, and show why critics' concerns regarding
the presumption are unfounded Properly understood, the fraud-createdthe-market theory is about materiality-fraudis so material, without it,
securitiesnever would have made it to market. In this regard,we show that
a presumption of reliance in the newly issued-securities context and the
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primary market is consistent with the Supreme Court's collapsing the
elements of securitiesfraud into a single inquiry whether the omission or
misrepresentation was material. We build upon Professor Donald C.
Langevoort's fresh interpretation of Basic's fraud-on-the-market
presumption and his interpretation of Stoneridge to show that the fraudcreated-the-marketpresumption is grounded in the Court'sjurisprudence.
We also find supportfor a judicially craftedpresumption in the context of
new issues in the securities laws themselves and in the common-law bases
for presumptions. Relying on scholarship both old and new, we support
judicial recognition of the fraud-created-the-markettheory, specifically in
cases involving bonds, in which the primary market may be informationally
efficient, and cases involving manipulative conduct, in which market
efficiency is irrelevant. The need for an answer to whether federal courts
should adopt the fraud-created-the-markettheory is pressing. The fraudcreated-the-market theory will play an increasingly important role in
actions againstthose involved in fraud relatingto the issuance of subprime
mortgage-backedsecurities.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has said, and recently reiterated in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., that reliance is an
essential element for liability under Rule lOb-5 of the securities laws.1
Reliance, according to the Court, ensures the requisite causal connection
2
between a defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiffs injury. Yet
what the Court has said differs from what the Court has done. The Court
has largely abrogated the reliance requirement to facilitate securities fraud
class actions, focusing instead on materiality. Under Rule 1Ob-5, the Court
has presumed reliance where there is an omission in the face of a duty to
disclose 3 or where there is a fraud on the secondary market.4 Now the new
frontier for presumptions of reliance is whether federal courts should
presume reliance in the primary market, giving rise to the fraud-createdthe-market theory. A decade ago the federal appellate courts presumed
reliance where fraud occurred on the primary market.5 These presumptions
enable class-wide resolution of securities fraud claims, without which
injured investors would unlikely be able to recover. 6 And as we have
shown in a series of prior articles and as scholars have accepted since, class
actions are vital to protecting investors.7 But the Court's Stoneridge
decision has caused sharp conflict as of late regarding the fraud-createdthe-market theory, and the Third and Ninth Circuits have recently set the
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008); Cent. Bank of
I.
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994).
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
2.
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
3.
4.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-45 (1988).
See infra Part II (discussing the rise and refinement of the fraud-created-the-market theory).
5.
6.
Without the class action, individual investors are unlikely to suffer losses sufficient to justify
an individual suit. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial
Creation of Class CertificationMerits Trials in Securities FraudActions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
323, 324 (2010); Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on
Federaland State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 489, 507 (1995).
7.
See, e.g., Kaufman & WundeTlich, Class CertificationMerits Trials, supra note 6; Michael J.
Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in
Securities FraudLitigation, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 183 (2009); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 61-64
(2010). Scholars continue to debate the merits of the lOb-5 private right of action. Compare William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The PoliticalEconomy of Fraudon the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 60
(2011), with James D. Cox, Securities Class Action as Public Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 73
(2011).
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pace for rejecting the presumption.8 In this Article we show that the fraudcreated-the-market theory is consistent with the fundamental basis for all
presumptions in the law, comports with the Court's interpretations of the
federal securities laws as properly understood, and serves the investorprotection and market-integrity design of securities regulation.
We undertake the first post-Stoneridge defense of the fraud-createdthe-market theory and show that critics' concerns regarding the
presumption are unfounded.9 First, Part II shows that the fraud-created-themarket theory is about materiality-fraud is so material that without it the
securities never would have made it to market.10 As Part III illustrates,
however, the federal courts, most notably the Third and Ninth Circuits,
have misunderstood and rejected the presumption." Once the fraudcreated-the-market theory is approached via materiality, Part IV
demonstrates that the presumption in the new-issue and primary-market
context is consistent with the Supreme Court's collapsing the elements of
securities fraud into a single inquiry whether the omission or
misrepresentation was material.12 We rely upon Professor Donald C.
Langevoort's fresh interpretation of Basic's fraud-on-the-market
presumption and his interpretation of Stoneridge to show that the fraudcreated-the-market presumption is grounded in the Court's jurisprudence. 3
In Part V we also find support for a judicially crafted presumption in the
context of new issues in the securities laws themselves and in probability,
policy, and fairness-the common law justifications for judicially
recognized presumptions.14 Relying on scholarship both old and new, we
support judicial recognition of the fraud-created-the-market theory,
specifically in cases involving bonds, in which the primary market may be
informationally efficient, or in cases involving manipulative conduct, in
which market efficiency is irrelevant. The need for an answer to whether
federal courts should adopt the fraud-created-the-market theory is pressing.
The fraud-created-the-market theory will play an increasingly important
role in actions against those involved in fraud relating to the issuance of
subprime mortgage-backed securities.

8.
See infra Part III (discussing the demise of the fraud-created-the-market theory in light of
Stoneridge).
9.
The last most vigorous defense for the fraud-created-the-market theory came before Stoneridge
in an excellent student note. See Peter J. Dennin, Note, Which Came First,the Fraudor the Market: Is
the Fraud-Created-the-MarketTheory Valid Under Rule 10b-5? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611 (2001).
10.
See infra Part II.
11.
See infra Part Ill.
12.
See infra Part IV.A.
13.
See infra Part IV.B.
14.
See infra Part V.A-B.
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II. RULE 101B-5, RELIANCE, AND THE RISE AND REFINEMENT OF THE
FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET PRESUMPTION

The securities laws protect investors by ensuring autonomous
investment decisions, which can only be made if investors have access to
all material information.15 Congress had to ensure the accuracy of the
information disclosed so that investors could rely upon it, and, to that end,
provided several private rights of action to victims of securities fraud to
deter false or misleading information.' 6 The courts also fostered the goal of
investor protection by implying remedies, the most potent of which is an
implied private right of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5.17 Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful,
directly or indirectly, by use of interstate commerce to either: (a) employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) make any untrue statement or
omission of material fact; or (c) engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud.' 8 Although the
judiciary has implied a right to sue under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, the
Supreme Court has constructed positive and common-law elements for the
cause of action that make it less attractive to investors.' 9 To recover for
securities fraud under Rule lOb-5, the Court has said, investors must
establish six elements, one of which is reliance. 20 Reliance, although

15.

MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES (SECURITIES LAW SERIES)

§ 1:3 (2010).
16.
See, e.g., Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (providing private cause of
action to securities purchasers against participants in an issuance who have made a material
misstatement or omission in a registration statement); Section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(a)(1) (2006) (providing private cause of action to any purchaser of a nonexempt security against
any person who offers or sells that security without an effective registration statement); Section 12(a)(2)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §771(a)(2) (2006) (granting private cause of action against any person who
offers or sells a security by a prospectus or oral communication that contains an omission or false
statement of material fact); Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2006) (providing private
cause of action to buyer or seller against any person who willfully participates in market manipulation
of securities registered on stock exchanges); Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010) (granting private cause of action to company to recover short-swing trading profits by
its officers, directors, or shareholders who own more than ten percent of the stock); Section 18 of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78r (granting private cause of action against those who make a material
misstatement or omission in any paper filed under the 1934 Act).
17.
In 1946, for the first time, a court held that investors could bring a private action for
violations of Rule lOb-5. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The
implied private right of action under Rule lOb-5 is now "simply beyond peradventure." Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
18.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011).
19.
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (noting that for investors to obtain class certification of a securities fraud claim they "must
thread the eye of a needle made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial decree and congressional
action").
20.
To establish a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, a plaintiff must
allege and prove the following: (1) that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission
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"bewildering," is often understood as the subjective aspect of causation, or
whether the fraud was a substantial factor in bringing about the investor's
purchase or sale of a security. 21 In this sense, reliance is a confluence of
materiality and causation.2 2
By insisting that reliance is essential to liability under Rule lOb-5, the
Supreme Court had to deal with the obstacle that individual questions of
reliance pose to class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.23 Without class certification, the economic incentive to bring securities
fraud claims is likely de minimis, and without enforcement of the securities
laws by these private attorneys general, the markets lack the holistic
regulation that Congress and the courts have prized. Presumptions of
reliance overcome the class-action barrier by making questions of reliance
common to a diverse group of investors.
The Supreme Court has recognized two presumptions of reliance, ergo
distinguishing reliance under the securities laws from "actual reliance"
required for fraud under the common law. Before turning to these two
presumptions, however, a word about presumptions generally.
Presumptions, "the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms," are
common in the law.24 They allocate the burden of proof in a civil case by
requiring the trier of fact to draw a particular conclusion once basic facts
are established.25 Presumptions often arise because (1) public policy
inclines courts to favor one contention by giving it the benefit of a
presumption; (2) direct proof is rendered difficult and a presumption
corrects an imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to proof;
or (3) proof of a certain fact renders the inference of the existence of
another fact so probable that courts save time presuming the truth of the

(materiality), (2) that the defendant acted with scienter or a wrongful state of mind (scienter), (3) that
the material misrepresentation or omission was made in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security (in connection with), (4) that the plaintiff relied on the material misrepresentation (reliance),
(5) that the plaintiff suffered an economic loss as a result (economic loss), and (6) that the material
misrepresentation actually caused the loss (loss causation). See Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 341-42 (2005).
21.

HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3B SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW

(SECURITIES LAW SERIES) § 13:25 (2d ed. 2011). "Materiality is the objective test of causation; material
information is information that would have been a substantial factor in the decision of a reasonable
man." Id.
22.
See, e.g., Stark Trading v. Falconbridge Ltd., 552 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2009); Eckstein v.
Balcor Film Investors, 58 F.3d 1162, 1171 (7th Cir. 1995); Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v.
Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1990); Titan Grp., Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234,
239 (2d Cir. 1975).
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraudon the Market, 2009 Wis. L. REV.
23.
151, 157-58 (2009).
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999); see also id. § 343
24.
(stating that hundreds of presumptions exist in the law).
FED. R. EVID. 301; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE
25.
UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, & PROBLEMS 671-72 (5th ed. 2004).
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inference until it is disproved.26 Presumptions can be conclusive or
rebuttable; a conclusive presumption is akin to a substantive legal rule and
cannot be rebutted by any evidence while a rebuttable presumption shifts
the burden of production to the other party, which then disappears if
enough counterproof is offered.2 7
The Supreme Court has established two rebuttable presumptions of
reliance: (1) under Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, if a
defendant makes a material omission to an investor to whom the defendant
owes a duty, then reliance is presumed; 2 8 and (2) under Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, if the defendant makes a material misrepresentation in a welldeveloped and efficient market, then reliance is presumed.29 Under the
theory adopted in Basic, which is known as the fraud-on-the-market theory,
courts presume investors' reliance when pursuing recovery for fraud on an
efficient secondary market, but investors do not enjoy a presumption of
reliance if the fraud occurred in an undeveloped or inefficient market.30
To obtain a presumption of reliance in the context of newly issued
securities, plaintiffs devised the fraud-created-the-market theory, which
assumes investors relied upon the market itself to prevent the entry of
"unmarketable" securities.3 1 For a security to be issued, a company must
disclose material information such that potential buyers can make an
informed investment decision.32 Companies might misrepresent or omit
material information to cause otherwise invalid securities to be issued into
the market, however. And the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
might not catch this because the agency generally does not perform due
diligence to ensure that disclosures are accurate, and other gatekeepers
might be asleep at the switch as well.33 If gatekeepers cannot prevent

26.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988); Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d
743, 749 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 202 (2008); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 24, §343.
27.
See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 201 (2008); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 25, at 673;
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3:6 (3d ed. 2010);
STEVEN GOODE & OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301

cmt. 2 (2010).
28.
406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
29.
485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988).
30.
See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2004); West v. Prudential
Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
31.

Dennin, supra note 9, at 2613; KAUFMAN, 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES, supranote

15, § 10:31.
32.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.

§§

77e,

77

g, 77aa (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see generally JOHN C.

COFFEE, JR., ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 136-253 (10th ed. 2007). In a

fraud-created-the-market suit, only buyers may bring suit. 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D.
LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD

33.

§ 7:492

(2d ed. 2010).

See Dennin, supra note 9, at 2622.
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securities from being issued, injured investors may seek to recover their
losses under Rule 1Ob-5 and the fraud-created-the-market theory.34
The seminal case endorsing the fraud-created-the-market theory came
in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Shores v. Sklar, which predates Basic, and
involved a securities fraud action brought under Rule lob-5(a) and (c)
against the issuers by a purchaser of tax-exempt bonds.3 5 In Shores, the
buyer claimed that the defendants fabricated the offering documents to
induce the municipality to issue and the investors to buy the bonds.36 The
sole income source used to amortize the bonds defaulted in payment,
however, and the bonds free-fell, leaving them worthless.37 The plaintiff
did not read or rely on the issuer's offering documents, but nonetheless
asserted that the defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to induce the
issuance and purchase of unmarketable bonds in violation of Rule lob-5.38
The twelve-judge majority held, over the ten-judge dissent, that the
plaintiff could sue under Section 10(b) by maintaining that the fraud
permitted the securities to exist on the market and that the investor relied
on its existence to his detriment.39 Under Shores, the investor relied on the
market's ability to furnish only those securities that are entitled to be
marketed. 4 0 According to the court, reliance is established when the
plaintiff can prove that the fraud is so pervasive that absent the fraud, the
bonds would have been "unmarketable."4A
The following Parts show that the fraud-created-the-market theory
posits that the defendants' fraud was so material that without it, the
defendants would have been unable to market the securities. 42 Under both
the decisions that endorse and reject the theory, such as the Fifth Circuit's
Shores decision and the Seventh Circuit's Eckstein decision, recovery is
limited to cases in which the fraud is so material that without it the

34.
Id.
35.
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). A tax-exempt bond is a bond
that pays tax-free interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (9th ed. 2009).
36.
Shores, 647 F.2d at 464.
Id. The municipality was going to build a mobile home facility, and it issued bonds to finance
37.
the project. The bonds were revenue bonds, not general obligation bonds, which meant that the bonds
had to be secured by a pledge of revenue. In Shores, the bonds were secured by a pledge of rent
payments that would be paid from a mobile home facility. Id. at 465.
Id. at 465, 467.
38.
39.
Id. at 469-7 1. The dissent disagreed with the majority on a number of grounds, namely that
(1) the fraud-on-the-market theory does not warrant an extension of reliance in the context of newly
issued securities; (2) the fraud-created-the-market presumption was counter to the purpose of the federal
securities laws, which favor disclosure only; and (3) the theory would unduly broaden the scope of the
Rule 1Ob-5 private cause of action. Id. at 472-73 (Randall, J., dissenting).
40.
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 469.
41.
42.
Securities are "unmarketable" if they have been issued only because of the issuer's fraud.
Dennin, supra note 9, at 2612.
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securities would not be successfully marketed at all.43 The federal courts
have recognized that misrepresentations or omissions that affect either the
economic or legal marketability of a security can be facts that satisfy this
degree of materiality.44 For example, reliance is presumed if the fraud
renders the stock economically unmarketable.4 5 Investors face a high
burden when arguing that the defendants' fraud rendered the securities
economically unmarketable-or "patently worthless"-as a bond or
security can virtually always be sold at some combination of price and
interest rate.46 The inquiry whether a security is patently worthless has a
certain degree of subjectivity to it, but no more so than the materiality
standard that applies to the securities laws and that the Supreme Court has
trusted a trier of fact to determine.47 The presumption premised on
economic unmarketability may be rebutted by showing the securities in fact
had value. Legal unmarketability presumes reliance if defendants' fraud
meant the securities had no business by law being on the market. 4 8 When
premised on legal unmarketability, defendants may rebut the theory by
showing legal compliance. Damages for a fraud-created-the-market case,
like any other Rule lOb-5 case, are the plaintiffs out-of-pocket losses. 49 A
review of the federal appellate courts reveals that before Stoneridge they
accepted the fraud-created-the-market theory when properly understood,
but rejected legal unmarketability and reliance premised on the integrity of
the regulatory process.50

43.
Case Note, Securities Laws-Rule l0b-5-Seventh Circuit Holds that Causation Can be
Established Without Reliance.-Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993), 107
HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1173 (1994).
44.
See Part IIA-C.
45.
Dennin, supra note 9, at 2623-24.
46.
Investors cannot recover, however, by proving only that the bonds or securities would have
been offered at a different price. Shores, 647 F.2d at 471; see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1059, 1060 n.5 (1990); Daniel S. Rosefelt, Note, Fraudon the Undeveloped Securities Market, 20
STETSON L. REv. 335, 357 (1990).
47.
Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (holding that information is
material if it would influence a reasonable investor's investment decision); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (same); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (same).
48.
Dennin, supranote 9, at 2624.
49.
Ross v. Bank S., NA., 885 F.2d 723, 743 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring); see also
Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The usual measure of
damages for securities fraud claims under Rule 1Ob-5 is out-of-pocket loss; that is, the difference
between the value of what the plaintiff gave up and the value of what the plaintiff received.").
50.
KAUFMAN, 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES, supra note 15, § 10:31. The Eighth
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have recognized the divergent approaches regarding the viability of the
fraud-created-the-market theory, but neither has endorsed or rejected the theory. In re Interbank
Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 2010); In re NationSmart Corp. Sec. Litig.,
130 F.3d 309, 321 (8th Cir. 1997). The First and Fourth Circuits have yet to address the issue.
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A. A Security's Economic Marketability
Some courts of appeals have adopted the fraud-created-the-market
theory when premised on economic unmarketability and used it to enable
class certification. In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit
presumed reliance because the defendants knew the enterprise itself was
"patently worthless" and because the defendants had no plans to operate an
actual business. 52 These federal courts of appeals somewhat disagree over
what it means to be patently worthless. The Fifth Circuit considers minimal
assets sufficient to justify the presumption. The Tenth Circuit and
Eleventh Circuit interpret "patently worthless" to mean that the securities
have absolutely zero underlying assets or that the fraud goes to the very
existence of the securities.54 Regardless of this difference, "economic
marketability" is a high standard and misrepresentations or omissions
cannot go to the possibility of some future event or a mere allegation that
estimates fell below projections.s Securities might be patently worthless,
for example, if the fraud goes to the events that are vital to the ultimate
success of a project or business that provided the basis for the offering.5 6
Two other circuit courts of appeals have openly questioned the fraudcreated-the-market presumption, but their reasoning suggests a
misunderstanding of the theory. The Sixth Circuit, in Ockerman v. May
Zima & Co., refused to accept the theory for class certification because,
according to the court, the market does not control the price of a newly
issued security; public information is not incorporated into the price of a
security on an inefficient market.57 The Seventh Circuit rejected the theory
51.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 391 (5th
Cir. 2007); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000); Ross, 885 F.2d at 729; Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988); Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356,
364-65 (5th Cir. 1987).
858 F.2d at 1121-22; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal., 482 F.3d at 391 n.36.
52.
Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122.
53.
54.
Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1164; Ross, 885 F.2d at 731 n.16; see also Ockerman v. May Zima &
Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994). In Joseph, MiniScribe Corp. sold more than $97 million worth
of convertible debentures in a public offering issued under a registration statement filed with the SEC.
223 F.3d at 1157. About two years after its offering, MiniScribe announced that it was restating its
financial statements because of accounting irregularities. Miniscribe cooked its books by shipping
bricks instead of product to warehouses, thus overstating revenues and earnings. The company reported
that it had overstated its revenues and earnings for years and in fact had a negative net worth of $88
million. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the investors were not entitled to the fraud-createdthe-market presumption because the securities were economically marketable; although the business
was seriously troubled, it was not illegitimate or a sham business entirely. Id. at 1164-65.
55.

KAUFMAN, 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES, supra note 15,

§ 10:31.

56.
Id.
57.
27 F.3d at 1159. In Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, the Sixth Circuit specifically declined
to address whether the fraud-created-the-market theory was valid. 915 F.2d 193, 199-200 (6th Cir.
1990). In Freeman, purchasers of tax-exempt municipal bonds used to finance the construction of a
retirement center sued persons involved in the issue of the bonds, claiming that they withheld from the

HeinOnline -- 63 Ala. L. Rev. 284 2011-2012

2012]

Fraud Created the Market

285

in Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, stating that although full disclosure
may lower the price, it does not exclude the securities from the market.
According to the Seventh Circuit, therefore, "the linchpin of Shores-that
disclosing bad information keeps securities off the market, entitling
investors to rely on the presence of the securities just as they would rely on
statements in a prospectus-is simply false. 59
If Eckstein is correct, however, that full disclosure of adverse
information would in fact have lowered the price, then the fraud would be
actionable under the fraud-on-the-market theory-by impounding
information into price, the market is consequently informationally efficient
and therefore can be relied upon.6 0 Even if Eckstein is wrong, the factors
relied upon by Ockerman-(1) complete assimilation of information into a
security's market; and (2) price-are still irrelevant. 6 ' The fraud-createdthe-market theory focuses not on an intentionally altered or mispriced
62
market price, but on the securities having a completely fraudulent price.
Actual price is not critical in fraud-created-the-market cases as the markets
are undeveloped and may not even have existed until soon before the
offering statement risks that they knew about, including that the market could not support the project,
that the lack of an on-site nursing station would cause the retirement center to fail, that fees were above
market rate, and that some of the project's managers and consultants suffered from a conflict of interest.
The Sixth Circuit refused to address the viability of the fraud-created-the-market theory. Id. Judge Guy
in concurrence, however, thought the issue was directly before the court and would have adopted the
fraud-created-the-market theory. Id. at 200 (Guy, J., concurring).
In Ockerman, a city issued mortgage revenue bonds for $5.5 million to finance a retirement
village. 27 F.3d at 1153. The city built the center using these proceeds, but the center never opened and
went into default. The project was later sold for a little over $1.3 million, and the bondholders
recovered only about $480,000 of the original $5.5 million investment. May Zima was the consultant on
the project who concluded that the project would most likely succeed, but May Zima did not disclose
that the chief promoters of the project were also developing competing retirement centers, that the
projected occupancy and rental rates were unsupported by the market, and that the facilities were less
than advertised. Id. at 1153-54.
58.
8 F.3d 1121, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Full disclosure of adverse information may lower the
price, but it does not exclude the security from the market. Securities of bankrupt corporations trade
freely; some markets specialize in penny stocks."). In Eckstein, Balcor Film Investors (BFI) tried to
raise $50 million in an initial public offering of limited partnership interests. When it failed to do so, it
lowered the minimum solicitation requirement to $35 million, offered to refund initial investments, and
began soliciting anew. The films the company invested in flopped, and about four years after its
inception, BFI informed investors that they would likely lose some of their capital. The plaintiffs
consisted of investors who had read the prospectus and those who had not. Those who had not read the
prospectus asserted that they bought the partnership interests relying on the integrity of the securities
offering process and that the IPO would not have gone forward without the misrepresentations and
omissions by BFI.
Id.
59.
60.
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supranote 21, § 13:32.
61.
Dennin, supra note 9, at 2639.
62.
Id. at 2640 ("The fraud-on-the-market theory presumes reliance in situations of intentionally
mispriced securities, while the fraud-created-the-market theory presumes reliance in situations where
securities are intentionally fraudulently marketed."); Jonathan A. Swanson, Note, Seventh Circuit
Rejects the "FraudCreated the Market" Theory-Conflict Among the Circuits Widens, 19 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 245, 259-60 (1994).
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plaintiff bought the security. 63 Price is usually set by an issuer and
underwriter without reference to an existing market for the security. 64
B. A Security's Legal Marketability
The Tenth Circuit has adopted the fraud-created-the-market theory
when premised on economic unmarketability and also when premised on
legal unmarketability.6 5 In T. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma
Irrigation Fuel Authority, the court upheld the plaintiffs' reliance on the
presence of bonds in the market because the defendant failed to comply
with numerous state laws and thus did not properly form a public trust.66
The Tenth Circuit stated that investors were entitled to rely on the market
to provide minimum assurance that securities are legally qualified to be
issued.6 7 No other circuit has adopted legal unmarketability. This branch of
the fraud-created-the-market theory is largely criticized because
gatekeepers, such as auditors, underwriters, and the SEC, do not vouch for
the substantive value of any issue or the veracity of any of the
representations by the issuer.68 The Seventh Circuit in Eckstein, for
example, observed that the fraud-created-the-market theory when premised
on legal unmarketability is incoherent because the existence of a security
does not depend on the adequacy of disclosure, as securities can and do
exist on the market even though there may be some incomplete disclosures
associated with them.69
C. The Integrity of the Regulatory Process
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the fraud-created-the-market theory
most broadly. In Arthur Young & Co. v. District Court, the Ninth Circuit
held that an investor relies, at least indirectly, on the integrity of the
regulatory process and the truth of any representations made to the
appropriate agencies at the time the security is issued. Contrary to
economic and legal unmarketability, the Ninth Circuit's approach focuses
63.
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 32, § 7:488.
64.
Id.
65.
Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb,
Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983).
66.
717 F.2d at 1333.
67.
Id.
68.
See, e.g., Note, The-Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1158 (1982).
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130-31 (7th Cit. 1993) ("The existence of a
69.
security does not depend on, or warrant, the adequacy of disclosure. Many a security is on the market
even though the issuer or some third party made incomplete disclosures. Federal securities law does not
include 'merit regulation."').
70.
549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1977).
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on the integrity of the regulatory process and is not dependent on
compliance with applicable regulations.71 No other court has accepted this
approach.72 Critics complain that reliance is unreasonable because
regulatory bodies, such as the SEC, do not evaluate companies or perform
due diligence on behalf of investors.
III. THE DEMISE OF THE FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET PRESUMPTION OF
RELIANCE

Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta was the Supreme
Court's first decision to address reliance since Basic in 1988.74 in
Stoneridge the Court held that those who aid and abet securities fraud, such
as lawyers, accountants, or third-party vendors, cannot be held liable under
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 absent a showing that the investors relied
upon the defendants' fraudulent conduct.75 The Court reiterated the two
reliance presumptions it created in Affiliated Ute for material omissions and
in Basic for fraud-on-the-market cases, but concluded that neither
presumption applied.76 Although this boilerplate recital of the presumptions
appears unimportant, this segment of the Court's decision spurred the
rejection of the fraud-created-the-market theory in some federal courts. 77
Because the Court delineated only two presumptions, the logic goes, only
two are intended. The decision was also couched in charged language, with
the Court making specific mention that expanding the scope of 1Ob-5
liability might deter overseas firms from doing business in the United
States, and thus raising the cost of being a publicly traded company.7 ' The

Id.
71.
Dennin, supra note 9, at 2636-37.
72.
See, e.g., Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000).
73.
552 U.S. 148 (2008).
74.
Id. at 153.
75.
Id. at 159.
76.
See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 754 (3d Cir. 2010); Desai v. Deutsche
77.
Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009); George v. Cal. Infrastructure & Econ. Dev. Bank,
No. 2:09-cv-01610 -GEB-DAD, 2010 WL 2383520, at *8 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2010); In re Refco, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008). The Supreme
78.
Court attributes investor flight abroad to expansive liability, but investor flight could be just as
attributable to a perceived lack of integrity in American markets because fraud is going unremedied or
simply because investors think American stocks are poor performers compared to their foreign
counterparts. See Paul Lim, Investors are Treating Wall Street Like Detroit, CNN MONEY (June 18,
2010, 9:22 AM), http://moremoney.blogs.money.cnn.com/2010/06/18/investors-are-treating-wall-streetlike-detroit/ (stating that "after years of poor performance, U.S. stocks, like American cars, are having a
tough time convincing investors that they're now a good buy"); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Joins
S.E.C. in Making a Case for Its Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at B7, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/wall-st-joins-s-e-c-in-plea-for-bigger-budget/?ref-business
(quoting an open letter to lawmakers by forty-one prominent securities lawyers and professionals as
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federal courts used this general hostility to put the kibosh on the fraudcreated-the-market theory.
A. Stoneridge and "Chary" Application of the Theory
Recently, the Ninth Circuit allowed a district court to reject the fraudcreated-the-market theory, relying on Stoneridge's policy that the 1Ob-5
action should not be extended and its statement that there are two
presumptions as evidence that only two exist. 79 In Desai v. Deutsche Bank
Securities, Ltd., the plaintiffs alleged that Deutsche Bank and a vice
president artificially inflated a company's stock price by using securities
loans to keep the price artificially high.80 The plaintiffs alleged that officers
of the company issued themselves unregistered, privately held shares, then
exchanged those shares to a broker-dealer for cash collateral and paid that
broker-dealer a rebate payment, which is like interest.8' The officers then
used the cash to buy the company's publicly traded shares, which created
the appearance of investor demand and inflated the stock price.82 Deutsche
Bank developed a chain of broker-dealers to generate rebate payments in
this way. 83 But once the broker-dealers started demanding their cash
collateral back, the company's stock price collapsed.84
Investors sued under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), claiming
that Deutsche Bank engaged in manipulative conduct and omitted material
information.85 They moved to certify a class arguing that the court could
presume that the investors relied on the integrity of the market. The
investors insisted that the market efficiency was irrelevant because they
saying "[i]nvestors sidelined with decimated 401(k)s will be unwilling to again risk their capital if Wall
Street's cop-on-the-beat increasingly comes to be seen by the public as a cop-on-furlough").
79.
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see
William F. Sullivan et al., Interpreting Reliance Two Years After Stoneridge, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 1202443231977&slreturn= I&hbxlogin= 1.
80.
Desai, 573 F.3d at 934. Securities lending is a method of finance in which securities are
temporarily transferred from a lender to a borrower. The borrower must return the securities to the
lender (either on demand or some other agreed upon date). Most securities loans are made against
collateral, such as cash, to protect the lender if the borrower defaults. FRANK J. FABOZZI & STEVEN V.
MANN, SECURITIES FINANCE: SECURITIES LENDING AND REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 3-8, 17 (2005).

"In the typical securities loan, a broker-dealer lends securities to another broker-dealer, the loan being
secured by cash collateral . . . ." Desai, 573 F.3d at 934. The broker-dealer who borrows the securities
receives rebate payments, which are like interest on the cash collateral transferred to secure the loan.
"As the value of the security increases, the amount of cash collateral and the level of interest also
increase." Id. These securities loans can manipulate the market of a security by creating the illusion of
more investor interest than really exists.
81.
An employee of the broker-dealer would falsify records to make it look like the shares had
come from other broker-dealers rather than the GENI officers themselves. Desai, 573 F.3d at 934.
82.
Id. at 934-35.
Id.
83.
84.
Id. at 935.
85.
Id. at 937-38.
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alleged that the defendants manipulated the market and not that they made
a misrepresentation or omissions; in a market-manipulation claim the
integrity of the market is what is being attacked.86 The district court denied
the motion and held that the theory was logically flawed because the
inference of reliance is broken if the market price of a security does not
reflect the manipulative activity. On appeal, the plaintiffs asked the court
to recognized the fraud-created-the-market theory and reverse the district
court.
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court was not required to
endorse the presumption because Stoneridge stated that the 1Ob-5 action
was not to be extended and Stoneridge named only two presumptions of
reliance, meaning that only two are intended. Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit, although "chary" of the theory, avoided deciding whether the
fraud-created-the-market theory was sound and simply concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion.9 0
In concurrence, Judge O'Scannlain faulted the majority for avoiding
the question and concluded that the presumption was legally unsupported
and logically inadvisable. 91 Although most investors generally assume that
the markets are not corrupt, the concurrence began, to presume reliance on
this basis alone would obviate the need to prove reliance in any case.92 The
concurrence was concerned that the theory would presume reliance no
matter how unlikely it is that the market price actually reflected the alleged
manipulation.9 3
86.
In re Genesisintermedia, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 01-9024-SVW VBKX, 2007 WL 1953475,
at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2007).
87.
Id. at *8, *15.
88.
Desai, 573 F.3d at 942.
89.
The court said:
In Stoneridge, the Court listed the Affiliated Ute presumption and the fraud on the market
presumption as the two reliance presumptions it has recognized. After concluding that
'[n]either presumption appli[ed],' it did not inquire into any other presumption that seemed
appropriate, but simply analyzed whether the plaintiffs could prove reliance directly. These
passages may not forbid the recognition of new presumptions, but they do illustrate that the
district court did not have to recognize this one.
Id. (alteration in original and citations omitted).
90.
Id.
91.
Judge O'Scannlain wrote:
[T]o reach the integrity of the market presumption on its merits is not a matter of choice....
Where the district court 'based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,' then it
'necessarily abuse[d] its discretion.' . . . I would address the integrity of the market
presumption on the merits. In my view, the presumption is legally unsupported and logically
inadvisable.
Id. at 943 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (second alteration in original and quoting Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).
92.
Id. at 944 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
93.
Id. at 945 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (stating that the presumption would "[p]rove too
much, because it would obviate the need for plaintiffs in manipulative conduct cases to prove reliance;
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B. Stoneridge as a Catalyst to Impugn the Theory Entirely
The Third Circuit's decision in Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP is the
most full-throated rejection of the fraud-created-the-market presumption of
reliance since Eckstein and Ockerman.9 4 In Malack, an investor bought
nontransferrable notes with no market for resale issued by American
Business Financial Services, Inc., a subprime-mortgage originator that
services primarily credit-impaired or subprime buyers. 9 5 During the
subprime mortgage meltdown, the notes were rendered worthless, and
ABFS filed for bankruptcy. The investor sued ABFS's accountant, BDO
Seidman, who provided clean audit opinions used to register the notes with
the SEC, and sought to certify a class of similar purchasers. 97
The investor argued that without the clean audits provided by BDO
Seidman, ABFS would have been unable to register the notes with the SEC
and the notes would have been unmarketable, and thus never bought.98 The
registration statements, according to the investor, failed to disclose that
ABFS had weak internal accounting controls and erroneously informed
investors that ABFS expected to pay back the notes with interest, but the
representations lacked a reasonable basis because ABFS's loan portfolio
was of poor quality, the value of its servicing agreements was materially
less than reported, and it overstated assets and operating results. 99 But
several investors admitted that they did not read the audits or the
registration statements before buying ABFS notes.' 00 Without a class-wide

do too little, because it does not complete the causal connection between a plaintiffs transaction in
securities and a defendant's manipulation").
94.
The decision received immediate attention for its rejection of the theory. See, e.g., Richard
Bortnick & Lawrence D. Jackson, Third Circuit Rejects "Fraud-Created-the-Market"Presumption as
Basis to Prove Transaction Causation, MONDAQ BLOG (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=109150; Chadbourne & Parke LLP, "Fraud Created the Market"
Securities FraudTheory Rejected by the Third Circuit, Widening CircuitSplit, CLIENT ALERT (Aug. 25,
2010), http://www.chadboume.com/files/Publication/ 656f9992 -3826 -4c25 -ace3 -33ede 8de9f6e/
Presentation/ Publication Attachment/ 34625 1ae -732d -448c -83be -38c239759986/ Security %20 Lit %20 Fraud %20 Created %20 Market %20 ca.pdf; Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Gives Thumbs Down
to 'Fraud-Created-Market' Theory, LAW.COM (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id=1202 469955659.
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 744-45 (3d Cir. 2010); Malack v. BDO
95.
Seidman LLP, No. 08-0784, 2009 WL 2393933, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2009). ABFS was a diversified
financial services organization that originated, bought, securitized, and sold home mortgage loans and
business loans. Malack, 2009 WL 2393933, at *1.
96.
Malack, 617 F.3d at 744-45.
97.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 745.
98.
Malack, 2009 WL 2393933, at *2. For example, the plaintiffs claimed that ABFS altered its
99.
loan delinquency ratio by labeling loans as delinquent only after sixty or ninety days passed, rather than
the required thirty days and engaging in aging techniques such as forbearance and deferment, thereby
improperly lowering the number of loans reported as delinquent. Id.
Id. at *5.
100.
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presumption of reliance afforded by the fraud-created-the-market theory,
the proposed investor-class could not show that common issues of reliance
predominated.' 0 ' The district court concluded that the investors failed to
show that the notes were unmarketable and denied class certification. 102
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the fraud-created-the-market
theory.10 3 The court said that an investor's reliance on a security's
availability on the market as an indication of its apparent genuineness was
unreasonable, and that "unmarketability" was an unworkable standard.104
The court also opined that the theory lacked any basis in fairness, public
policy, or probability. 0 s First, the court turned to probability-whether the
proof of one fact renders the inference of the existence of another fact so
probable that courts save time by assuming the truth of the other fact until
the adversary disproves it.10 6 The Third Circuit said that reliance was
unreasonable because the entities responsible for bringing a security to
market do not imbue the security with any guarantee against fraud. 0 7
According to the court, promoters, underwriters, auditors, and lawyers
cannot be relied upon to prevent fraud because all have a significant selfinterest in marketing the securities at the highest possible price. 0 8 With
respect to the SEC, the court continued, the agency does not review the
merits of a registration statement or offering, and ergo cannot be relied
upon.109 The Third Circuit also repeated Eckstein's oft-quoted language
that although disclosure of adverse information may lower the price, it
would not prevent the security from going to the market." 0 (In this regard,
the Third Circuit repeats Eckstein's error: if disclosure would have affected
the price, it cannot be differentiated from the fraud-on-the-market theory.)
Second, the court asked whether the presumption furthered any sound
policy. The court was concerned that adoption of the fraud-created-themarket theory would encourage investors to forego reading disclosure

101.
Malack, 617 F.3d at 745.
102.
Malack, 2009 WL 2393933, at *8-*12.
103.
Malack, 617 F.3d at 745. The Third Circuit was mindful that district courts in the Third
Circuit had previously endorsed the fraud-created-the-market theory, but overruled these decisions. Id.
at 748; see Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 776 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Wiley v. Hughes
Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264, 1293 (D.N.J. 1990).
104.
Malack, 617 F.3d at 749.
105.
Id. at 749.
106.
Id. Though the court framed its inquiry in terms of "common sense" as well as probability,
the inquiry is essentially the same: whether the proof of fact A renders the inference of fact B more
probable.
Id. at 749-50.
107.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 750-51.
110.
Id.

HeinOnline -- 63 Ala. L. Rev. 291 2011-2012

292

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 63:2:275

documents because no matter what, the security's presence on the market
would be enough to satisfy the element of reasonable reliance."'
The court also found support for rejecting the theory in Stoneridge.
According to the court, Stoneridge and Central Bank evidence a general
intent to narrow the scope of Section 10(b) liability. 1 12 The court pointed to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) as evidence
that Congress wants to end costly securities lawsuits. 13 With respect to a
new presumption of reliance in particular, the court was worried that a
presumption of reliance would be too powerful a tool for investors seeking
class certification.' 14 Class certification, the court stated, unduly pressures
defendants to settle frivolous claims." 15
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET
THEORY

The fraud-created-the-market theory must be consistent with the
Supreme Court's securities fraud jurisprudence.' 16 Several federal courts,
including the Third and Ninth Circuits, have concluded that the theory is
inconsistent with Stoneridge or at least that the decision casts doubt on its
continued viability." 7 Other critics contend that the theory is inconsistent
with the fraud-on-the-market theory as adopted in Basic or the general
requirement of reliance." 8 These critics read too much into Stoneridge and
too little into the Court's other securities-fraud decisions. As these next
Parts show, the recent rejection of the theory is unwarranted. The fraudcreated-the-market theory is consistent with the Court's precedent

Ill.
Id. at 753.
112.
Id. at 753-54. "Although the Stoneridge Court was not specifically considering the fraudcreated-the-market theory, we view its instruction as general support for rejecting such new
presumptions of reliance." Id. at 754.
Id.
113.
114.
Id. at 755.
Id.
115.
116.
See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("If
a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
Malack, 617 F.3d at 754; Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir.
117.
2009); George v. Cal. Infrastructure & Econ. Dev. Bank, No. 2:09-cv-01610-GEB-DAD, 2010 WL
2383520, at *8 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2010); In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Malack, 617 F.3d at 750-51; Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130-31
118.
(7th Cir. 1993) (criticizing the fraud-created-the-market doctrine as inconsistent with the efficientmarket theory); Levine v. Prudential Bache Props., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 924, 932-33 (N.D. Ill. 1994); see
also Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and UnwarrantedExtension of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359, 374-75, 388-91 (1995); Macey & Miller, supra
note 46, at 1060 n.5.
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generally, and with Stoneridge in particular. The hallmark for liability
under 1Ob-5 is materiality, thus obviating the need to show reliance in
many cases.'l9 Moreover, the Court has interpreted reliance consistent with
this materiality-focused bent specifically to achieve class-wide resolution
of securities fraud claims.12 0 Further, Stoneridge despite appearances, has
nothing to do with reliance, but rather a defendant's duty under the
securities laws.'21
A. The "Material"Essence ofLiability UnderRule JOb-5
The 1Ob-5 action evolved to remedy the shortcomings of common-law
fraud for injured investors.122 The Supreme Court and the federal appellate
courts have largely reduced liability under Rule lOb-5 to a single question
of materiality, by which we mean whether a material misstatement or
omission creates a negative disparity between the price at which the
plaintiff trades a security and its real value at the time of the transaction.123
The six traditional elements of securities fraud are listed as: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter, or a wrongful state of mind; (3)
a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance;
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.12 4 Each element dovetails into the
materiality inquiry.
First, investors can show that the fraud was in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security by showing that the defendant's conduct
created a price-value disparity.12 5 Second, investors can show that the
119.
See supraPart IV.A.
120.
See supraPart IV.A-B.
121.
See supra Part IV.C.
122.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 173 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975)
("[T]he typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and deceit evolved was light
years away from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule lOb-5 is applicable.").
123.
Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095, 1101-02 (Colo. 1995); Ray J.
Grzebielski, Should the Supreme Court Recognize General Market Reliance in PrivateActions Under
Rule 10b-5?, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 335, 349 (1984); Michael J. Kaufman, Living in a Material World:
Strict Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1990); Michael J. Kaufman, The Uniform
Rule ofLiability Under the FederalSecurities Laws: The Judicial Creationofa Comprehensive Scheme
oflnvestor Insurance, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 62 (1990). Reducing liability to materiality is tantamount
to strict liability for material misstatements or omissions, but the degree of the wrongdoer's exposure is
limited to the precise effect of the challenged fraud on the price of a securities transaction, and the
burden of showing materiality is difficult. Id. at 62-63.
124.
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
125.
In Superintendentof Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971), the Supreme
Court held that Rule 1Ob-5 requires only that the fraud "touch" the sale or purchase of a security, and in
proving that conduct "touched" the transaction, showing that the conduct created a disparity between
the transaction price and the value of the security is always sufficient. Kaufman, Living in a Material
World, supra note 123, at 6-7.
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defendant acted with scienter by showing some degree of recklessness, 126
which courts have taken to mean that the defendant knew or should have
known about a material misstatement's or omission's likely effect on the
stock price. 12 7 The "core operations" inference of scienter makes the
connection between scienter and materiality clear. Under the core
operations inference, courts presume scienter because a fact is so critical to
a business's core operations or so important generally, that it would be
absurd to suggest that key officers lacked knowledge of it. 128 Third, loss
causation likewise depends on plaintiffs showing that fraud proximately
caused "economic loss," 1 2 9 which has been interpreted to mean "market
impact," i.e., a post-transaction decline in stock price." 0
Most important for the fraud-created-the-market presumption, the
Supreme Court deviated from the common-law requirement of actual
reliance and presumed reliance when either fraud occurred on the

126.
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007); City of
Dearborn Heights v. Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011); In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.,
627 F.3d 376, 390 (9th Cir. 2010); La. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 F.3d 471, 478
(6th Cir. 2010); Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 686 (1lth Cir. 2010); In re
Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 2008); Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v.
Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 2007); ATSI Commc'ns., Inc. v. Shaar Fund,
Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Teachers' Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 183-84 (4th
Cir. 2007); In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2004); Adams v. KinderMorgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1095 (10th Cir. 2003); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977).
127.
See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796-97 (2010) ("We recognize that certain
statements are such that, to show them false is normally to show scienter as well. It is unlikely, for
example, that someone would falsely say 'I am not married' without being aware of the fact that his
statement is false."); City of Dearborn Heights, 632 F.3d at 757 ("A plaintiff must provide evidence
showing not only that a statement or omission was false or misleading, but also that it was made in
reference to a matter of material interest to investors. . . . If it is questionable whether a fact is material
or its materiality is marginal, that tends to undercut the argument that defendants acted with the
requisite intent or extreme recklessness in not disclosing the fact.") (internal quotations and citations
omitted); City of Philadelphia. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[W]hether
Defendants recklessly failed to disclose [a fact] is . . . intimately bound up with whether Defendants
either actually knew or recklessly ignored that the [fact] was material and nevertheless failed to disclose
it."); see also Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraudon the Market Meets BehavioralFinance, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 511-12 (2006); Kaufman, The Uniform Rule ofLiability, supra note 123, at 8889. Justice Scalia remarked at oral argument in Matrixx Initiatives,Inc. v. Siracusano, a case that will
decide whether a misstatement or omission is material by virtue of a statistically significant movement
in stock price, that there really is no difference between scienter and materiality. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 43, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 09-1156).
128.
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, 26A SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES (SECURITIES LAW SERIES)
§ 24:56 (2010).
129.
Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
130.
See Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation Under the
Federal SecuritiesLaws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 7 (2005); Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse
of Market Efficiency in Market Manipulation Class Actions, 52 WM & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1211 n. 41
(2011) (stating that courts have held the loss causation requirement to mean market impact).
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secondary market under Basic,'3 1 or in the case of a material omission in
the face of a duty to disclose under Affiliated Ute.1 32 Abrogating direct
proof of reliance in the context of new issues is consistent with the
displacement of many of the common-law elements of securities fraud in
favor of an analysis focused on materiality. Adopting the fraud-created-themarket presumption eliminates positive proof of reliance and simplifies
Rule lOb-5 by discarding the need for investors to classify the defendant's
fraud as involving an omission, half-truth, or misrepresentation, which is
often a difficult task.13 3 And materiality is the upshot of Shores and the
fraud-created-the-market theory: the fraud-created-the-market theory posits
that the misrepresentation was so material that if it had been known, then
the securities never would have made it to market.134
B. PragmaticandNormative Presumptions ofReliance
The Supreme Court's presumptions of reliance are grounded in
pragmatic concerns to enable class certification and promote normative
reliance. The fraud-created-the-market presumption is consistent with both
these aims. To begin, take Affiliated Ute, which established a rebuttable
presumption in cases involving omissions under Rule 1Ob-5.1 35 Originally it

131.
Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on
Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330, 336
(2008).
132.
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
133.
Grzebielski, supra note 123, at 349; see also In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 668
F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing between omissions and
misrepresentations).
134.
Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729 (1lth Cir. 1989) ("[T]he fraud must be so
pervasive that it goes to the very existence of the bonds and the validity of their presence on the
market."); see also Kaufman, Living in a Material World, supra note 123, at 47-48. Basic's accepted
materiality/causation substitute for reliance provides strong support for the fraud-created-the-market
theory. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 32, § 7:485.
135.
In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court presumed reliance on a defendant's misrepresentations
rather than requiring proof of actual reliance. 406 U.S. at 153-54. The plaintiffs, two mixed-blood
members of the Ute Indian tribe, sold securities to bank employees who later resold the stock at a higher
price in the secondary market without disclosing that the securities were being traded in the secondary
market at a higher price. Id. at 135-39, 145-48. The plaintiffs sued and claimed that the bank
employees violated Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c)-which prohibits fraud in the course of business or through a
device, scheme, or artifice-because the defendants failed to disclose material information to the
persons for whom they traded stock. Id. at 145-46. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs could
not recover because they failed to show that they actually relied on any material misrepresentations by
the defendants. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970). The Court rejected the
Tenth Circuit's decision and presumed that the investors relied on the omitted information. Affiliated
Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
As an aside, defendants may rebut this presumption by showing that regardless of the disclosure of the
material information, the investor still would have invested. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit
Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 383 (5th Cir. 2007). For example, if the case involves a
defendant's failure to disclose a material fact in offering materials, then the defendant may show that
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was thought that the Court's abrogation of reliance in Affiliated Ute applied
to all Rule lOb-5 actions.' 36 But later decisions clarified that reliance is
presumed only if the defendant omits material facts while under a duty to
disclose. 13 7 The Court interpreted reliance flexibly. The presumption
reflects the Court's concern that practically speaking, to saddle a plaintiff
with proving reliance upon concealed information would saddle the
plaintiff with a nearly impossible burden.138 By presuming reliance,
Affiliated Ute departed from the common law's requirement of actual
reliance and emphasized that the focus in a failure-to-disclose case is on the
materiality of the omitted information.' 3 9 The Court's holding in this regard
echoed its earlier holding in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., in which it
recognized that proof of actual reliance by thousands of persons would not
be feasible and that nondisclosure of a fact is a particularly difficult matter
to define or prove.140 The federal courts have echoed this interpretation and
observed that Affiliated Ute is an indication "that the securities laws do not
use 'reliance' in the lay sense, [and] that only the conjunction of materiality
and causation matters."'41
As now understood, Affiliated Ute established a narrow presumption
that applies only to a defendant's failure to disclose material information in
the face of a duty to disclose.142 But the Supreme Court adopted a much
broader presumption of reliance in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.143 In Basic, the
the plaintiff never read the offering materials and therefore did not rely upon them. 3 THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION

§ 12.10[1]

(5th ed. 2005).

Mark A. Helman, Rule 10b-5 Omissions Cases and the Investment Decision, 51 FORDHAM
136.
L. REv. 399, 401 (1982).
137.
Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54. In cases where the plaintiff alleges both a material
omission and an affirmative misrepresentation, if the gravamen of the fraud is a failure to disclose
material information, then the court will presume reliance. See Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1363
(5th Cir. 1988). The omission need not occur face to face. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 262,
374 (D.N.J. 2007).
138.
Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 151, 153-54; see Steven A. Fishman, Duty to Disclose Under
Rule l0b-5 in Face-to-FaceTransactions, 12 J. CORP. L. 251, 305 (1987) ("Without the presumption,
the plaintiff in a nondisclosure case would be required to prove what he would have done in the event
that the undisclosed material information had been disclosed. This burden would be a very difficult one
to meet."); A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The PoliticalEconomy
of Securities Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 217, 220 (2008) ("[I]t was obviously
impossible for the plaintiffs to plead actual reliance because the violation was a failure to speak, rather
than a misstatement. . . .").
Note, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 86 HARV. L. REv. 268, 270 (1972).
139.
140.
396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970).
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 58 F.3d 1162, 1171 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Latigo
141.
Ventures v. Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1989); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787
F.2d 355, 366 (9th Cir. 1986); Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 529
(7th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981).
Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
142.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). The Ninth Circuit in Blackie v. Barrack
143.
first articulated the fraud-on-the-market theory, stating that investors rely "generally on the supposition
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Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of reliance under
Rule 1Ob-5(b) if the defendant makes a material misstatement in an
efficient market-the fraud-on-the-market theory.14 4 The Court's analysis
shows that it superseded reliance as an element in favor of materiality out
of considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability.
First, the Court stated that reliance is essential to recover under Rule
lOb-5.145 Professor Langevoort notes that this starting point is significant:
"the Court could have said that causation was the only requirement," and
that reliance is just one way to show the causal connection between the
harm and the fraud; if the Court took this route, then the decision would
have been straightforward.146 But once the Court made reliance essential,
Langevoort explains, the Court had to explain how a typical investor relies
on a corporate misrepresentation of which one is likely unaware and why
that kind of reliance is so pervasive that it can be deemed common among
all purchasers or sellers of securities to justify class treatment under Rule
23.147 To that end, Basic adopted the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance for securities traded on efficient markets. 14 8 The Court's solution
was pragmatic- "presumptions make judges' work manageable, are useful
responses to uncertainty, and help pursue sound public policy." 49 Courts
could presume that an investor relies generally on the assumption that the
market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has
artificially inflated that price.15 0 The fraud-on-the-market theory allows a

that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the
price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price-whether he is
aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations." 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir.
1975).
144.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. Basic was interesting in that the segment of the decision that adopted
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance was a 4-2 decision, from which Justices O'Connor and
White dissented. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy took no part in the decision. But in Erica P.
John FundInc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011), the full Court reaffirmed the fraud-on-themarket theory and its presumption of reliance for securities fraud class actions.
145.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
146.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 157. Reliance is not an element of
enforcement actions by the SEC. See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008).
147.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 158. To certify a class action under Rule 23
investors must show that common issues predominate. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
148.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
149.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 158.
150.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-46; Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975).
Defendants may rebut the presumption by, among other ways, showing that the investors would have
bought or sold regardless of what was known about the issuer or the stock. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. The
fraud-on-the-market presumption is rebuttable at trial. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49 n.29. When a
defendant may rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption has recently divided the federal courts of
appeals despite this clear indication from the Supreme Court and resulted in unjustified merits inquiries
when plaintiffs attempt to certify a class action. See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc.,
No. 09-56965, 2011 WL 5341285 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) (discussing the circuit split).
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court to certify a class of injured investors by presuming reliance even
though there may be different levels of reliance among its members.' 5 1
The Supreme Court justified the presumption of reliance first by
relying on the efficient-market hypothesis. The efficient-market hypothesis
posits that in an efficient market, stock prices fully reflect all available
information.152 Too much uncertainty is inherent in economic life,
however, to contend that markets always prove correct.153 Accordingly, the
central claim of the efficient-market hypothesis is that "consensus valuation
of an efficient market will be the best possible, least biased measure of
value at any given time."' 5 4 Professor Eugene Fama has distinguished three
forms of the efficient-market hypothesis: strong, semi-strong, and weak.'
The weak version posits that prices incorporate information in a way that
prevents only the historical pattern of prices from being used to predict
changes in price-in other words, the price history of a security provides
no useful information to the investor, and only someone with new
information can make a trading profit. 5 6 The semi-strong version contends
that publicly released information, such as information contained in SEC
filings, provides no useful information to the investor-the investor can
ignore new information and rely solely on prices. 57 Last, the strong version
hypothesizes that even nonpublic information is reflected in price-prices
set in this way accurately reflect the firm's value.'1s The fraud-on-themarket doctrine rests on the semi-strong form: public statements are
impounded in the stock price.
A presumption based on the efficient-market hypothesis is problematic,
though, because for every investor who passively relies upon just the price,

Dennin, supranote 9, at 2621.
151.
The efficient-market hypothesis posits "that available information about securities traded in
152.
the principal securities markets is impounded into stock prices with sufficient speed that even
sophisticated investors cannot systematically profit by trading on newly available information."
COFFEE, JR., ET AL., supra note 32, at 213. The court in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286-87
(D.N.J. 1989), identified five factors that prove useful in proving that a security was traded in an
efficient market: (1) a large weekly trading volume; (2) the existence of a significant number of reports
by securities analysts; (3) the existence of market makers and arbitrageurs in the security; (4) the
eligibility of the company to file an S-4 Registration Statement; and (5) a history of immediate
movement of the stock price caused by unexpected corporate events or financial releases.
153.

COFFEE, JR., ET AL., supra note 32, at 214.

Id.
154.
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
155.
FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
COFFEE, JR., ET AL., supra note 32, at 214; see Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th
156.
Cir. 2010); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 10 n.16 (1st Cir. 2005).
157.
COFFEE, JR., ET AL., supra note 32, at 214; see Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685; Tenn. Gas
Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
158.

COFFEE, JR., ET AL., supranote 32, at 214.

159.
Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685; Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487
F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d at 10 n.16.
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millions of others rely on their broker or adviser.160 So passivity as a basis
for the presumption "is a hopeless fiction," and thus, the failure to exclude
implies
with
actively
managed
portfolios
the
investors
overcompensation. 161
To remedy this problem, Langevoort continues, Basic justified the
presumption of reliance on more than the efficient-market hypothesis
alone: the Supreme Court also said that investors rely on a security's
integrity-implicitly assuming that the price has not been distorted by
fraud-as well as its price.162 By resting the presumption on the idea that
investors considered the market price to be honest, Langevoort observes,
the problem of over-breadth within the class diminishes.163 This
justification is problematic as well, however, in that no reasonable investor
assumes that fraud and manipulation are completely absent from the stock
market. 16 4 Yet to the extent the presumption is normative-"a declaration
that investors should be able to rely on stock-price integrity," and purely a
matter of "juristic grace"-the presumption is consistent with
congressional intent underlying the securities laws. 65
Additionally, Basic was the apex of a series of decisions in which the
Supreme Court interpreted the substantive elements of securities fraud to
facilitate their class-wide resolution.16 6 The Court first adopted a
presumption of reliance in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., for private Rule
14a-9 claims. 66 Then, in Affiliated Ute, the Court adopted a presumption of
reliance in Rule lOb-5 claims.1 68 And finally, in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., the Court adopted an objective approach to materiality to
make classwide adjudications possible.169
The fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic is a practical response to the
problem of producing proof in impersonal markets and to satisfying the
requirements for class certification. The presumption remedies the
conundrum of how investors could have been defrauded by information
160.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 159.
161.
Id.; Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to
Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 2125, 2139 (2010). Professor
Langevoort also notes that "[m]ore troubling ... the class of investors invited to seek recovery, and thus
the amount of recovery, would be grossly inflated." Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 159.
162.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 159-60.
163.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supra note 161, at 2140.
164.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 160; Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge
Carefully, supra note 161, at 2140.
165.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 160-61.
166.
Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing "the
Reasonable Investor" with "the Least SophisticatedInvestor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 Tul. L. Rev.
473, 487-88 (2006).
167.
396 U.S. 375, 380-85 (1970).
168.
406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972).
169.
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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they never heard, read, or understood if they did. Presuming reliance from a
single fraud on the market means that issues of reliance common to the
proposed class predominate, as required under Rule 23.170 Similar to
Affiliated Ute, Basic supplants reliance as an independent element and
allows the market price to transmit both information and cause the loss.17 1
Basic holds that a court "need only believe that market professionals
generally consider most publicly announced material statements about
companies, thereby affecting stock market prices."l72 The fraud-on-themarket presumption is appropriately best understood as an entitlement to
rely on the market price as undistorted by fraud.17 1
C. Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance or
Duty?
The Supreme Court's decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta, was its first decision since Basic to seemingly address
reliance.' 74 In actuality, however, Stoneridge deals only with a defendant's
duty under the securities laws.17 5 As Professor Langevoort explains,
Stoneridge is best understood in terms, not of reliance, but of duty-as

170.

KAUFMAN, 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES, supra note 15,

§

10:30; 7 WILLIAM

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., PresumptionofReliance Under Fraudon Market Theory, in NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS §22:61 (4th ed., 2010).
171.
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2010); see Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
82 F.3d 1194, 1218 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that Basic obviates plaintiffs' need to prove individualized
reliance); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that reliance is just a
code word for causation); see also Kaufman, Living in a Material World, supranote 123, at 30 (stating
that despite Basic's assertion that reliance is an element of Rule lOb-5 liability, Basic's explanation of
reliance effectively removes it as an element in most Rule IOb-5 cases).
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988).
172.
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 176. Langevoort ultimately concludes
173.
that:
To the extent that we continue to insist on reliance-an insistence that Stoneridge repeatsovercompensation comes from allowing recovery as a result of the practical impediments
that effectively make the presumption conclusive by those who simply would not be able to
demonstrate justifiable reliance on the fraud if put to the task.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supra note 161, at 2140.
The decision is generally understood as delineating the scope of reliance as an element of
174.
securities fraud. See, e.g., Black, supra note 13 1, at 334.
175.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). Stoneridge
was the Court's follow-up to Central Bank. In Central Bank, the Court held that Section 10(b) did not
extend to aiding and abetting, rather only a "primary violator" could be liable under the securities laws.
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (2004). The Court's
decision in Central Bank is notable in that the Court on its own motion determined that aiding and
abetting liability was unavailable; the issue was not presented by the parties to the Court. Charles W.
Murdock, Corporate Corruption and the Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court-The
Tortuous Pathfrom Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 163,
203 (2009). Indeed, before CentralBank, all federal courts of appeals had recognized a private cause of
action against aiders and abettors under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 163, 203.
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saying that only certain kinds of actors and conduct ought to be subjected
to the extraordinary risk of a fraud-on-the-market lawsuit-i.e., that the
enforceable duty of candor owed specifically to all investors in the capital
marketplace should be limited and should not attach to "the whole
marketplace in which the issuing company does business" unless the actors
can fairly be said to owe a cognizable duty to the marketplace.176
In Stoneridge, investors sued two of their company's vendors,
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, alleging that they agreed to swap
advertising for inflated prices on cable boxes.' 77 Even though the
advertising was essentially free to the vendors, the company reported
revenue in its earnings reports. 17 8 To hide the swap from the company's
auditor, the company and the vendors backdated documents and
represented the sales as cable-box sales.'79 The investors alleged that even
though the vendors had nothing to do with the company's false earnings
reports, the vendors engaged in a deceptive scheme in violation of Rule
lOb-5.' 80 The Supreme Court concluded that the investors did not rely on
the vendors' actions, and thus could not maintain a suit under Rule
1Ob-5.
It is significant that the Court framed its decision in terms of reliance,
and that it reiterated the presumptions it applied in Affiliated Ute for
material omissions and Basic for fraud-on-the-market cases, but concluded
that neither presumption applied.18 2 First, federal courts took Stoneridge's
recitation of the two presumptions of reliance under Rule 1Ob-5 to mean
that there can be only these two. This expressio unius logic does not apply,

Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supranote 161, at 2137 (quoting Stoneridge, 552
176.
U.S. at 160). Professor Langevoort's thesis has been implicitly recognized by other scholars. For
example, Professor Roberta S. Karmel states that:
It is illogical and bad policy for investors to be able to hold seasoned issuers to the
statements they make or fail to make in SEC filings and similar documents, but not to be
able to sue unseasoned issuers for fraud in the statements they make in SEC filings or other
deliberate utterances. Why should investors not be able to rely upon the truth of statements
by issuers, and why should such statements not be presumed to be reflected in securities
prices if they are material? Yet, extending the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to statements by
third parties, who are not required to speak by SEC regulations and do not owe a duty to
investors or shareholders, seems to encourage too much questionable litigation.
Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, 63 Bus.
LAW. 25, 49 (2007). Professor Charles W. Murdock also implicitly recognizes that Stoneridge is best
understood in terms of duty, but criticizes this approach as "nonsensical to constrain the application of
the securities laws by common law notions of 'duty,' when the securities laws were enacted because
inadequacies in the scope of responsibility under the common law." Murdock, supra note 175, at 205.
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 154.
177.
178.
Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 154.
179.
Id. at 154-55.
180.
Id. at 166-67.
181.
Id. at 159.
182.
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however, if context suggests that the listing is noncomprehensive. 18 3
Frankly, the fraud-created-the-market theory was not on the Court's
radar.184 But in any event, Stoneridge is not about reliance and, as a
consequence, has no bearing on the fraud-created-the-market theory. 8 The
federal courts inappropriately converted a descriptive statement into a
normative one.
Second, by framing the holding in terms of reliance, Stoneridge forces
us to confront the tension between its holding that secondary actors cannot
be liable if their deceptive acts are not disclosed to the public (and thus
were not relied upon), and the Court's statement that conduct itself can be
deceptive and therefore satisfy Rule 1Ob-5.'" Stoneridge involved a classic
case of indirect reliance: the investors alleged that the vendors directly
misled Charter's auditor, which in turn led the auditor to certify false
financials, which then distorted Charter's market price. 187 "The notion that
the plaintiffs had not relied on [the vendors'] misrepresentations because
the plaintiffs had not seen those misrepresentations seems inconsistent with
the indirect reliance inherent in the fraud on the market theory adopted by
the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson."'88 Rather, to distinguish the
indirect reliance at issue in Stoneridge, the Court insisted that the investors'
reliance upon the vendors' actions was an indirect chain that was too
"remote" and attenuated for liability to attach.1 89 Thus, Stoneridge does not
build on reliance as explained in Affiliated Ute or Basic.190 It's a different
animal altogether.

183.

See, e.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374-76 (2007); Christensen v.

Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 583-84 (2000).
184.
The closest references to the theory come in citations by amicus curiae to Shores v. Sklar
and Abbell v. Potomac, but not for any proposition of law related to the fraud-created-the-market
theory. Brief for Change to Win and the CtW Investment Group as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 28 n.27, Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43); Brief
for Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19 n. 10,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43).
185.
See Reed Kathrein, Market Manipulation Cases Can Never be Certified, So Says Ninth
Circuit?, KATHREIN ON INVESTOR FRAUD (July 30, 2009), http://corpfraud.typepad.com/
corporate fraud blog/2009/07/market-manipulation-cases-can-never-be-certified-so-says-ninthcircuit.html (noting that the Ninth Circuit in Desai pulled Stoneridge's quote regarding the two
presumptions out of context).
186.
See Todd G. Cosenza, Applying Stoneridge to Restrict Secondary Actor Liability Under Rule
1Ob-5, 64 Bus. LAW. 59, 59-60 (2008).
187.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully,supra note 161, at 2133.
188.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay on Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 451 (2009).
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159-60.
189.
190.
See Pritchard,supra note 138, at 241. Professor Robert A. Prentice persuasively argues that
Stoneridge even left open whether scheme liability is valid, the exact issue the Court set out to resolve.
Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does it Have a Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 351,
394 (2009).
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Once Stoneridge is framed in terms of duty rather than reliance,
according to Langevoort, the Court's discussion of "attenuation" and
"remoteness," and the rules surrounding secondary-actor liability make
sense: Stoneridge's discussion of "attenuation" and "remoteness" in terms
of reliance is premised "on the assumption that too much attenuation or
remoteness makes it unfair to hold the third party liable for extraordinary
fraud-on-the-market damages."'91
Reading Stoneridge in this fashion, Professor Langevoort derives five
duty-based rules in fraud-on-the-market cases, several of which exemplify
the propriety of the fraud-created-the-market theory.19 2
First, a third party owes a duty to an investor if that third party
identifies itself, or allows itself to be identified, in a manner that would lead
a reasonable investor to believe that the third party was assuming
responsibility for the accuracy of the public communication by the primary
violator.' 93 This rule explains the vein of cases that require "attribution"that public misstatements be attributed to the third party at the time of
dissemination-in order for an investor to be said to rely on the third
party.19 4 Second, a third party owes a duty to an investor via a fiduciary
relationship.' 9 5 This situation would impose liability upon corporate
officers, directors, and other agents (all fiduciaries), to their own investors.
Third, a third party owes a duty to an investor if the third party enjoys a
professional status or expertise in the world of finance such that the third
party appreciates both the regulatory constraints and the economic harm
that would flow from misinformation spread into the investment
marketplace.19 6 The Court in Stoneridge stressed that the vendors were
dealing with the company in "the realm of ordinary business" operations as
opposed to the realm of finance.197 But, as Langevoort observes, this
191.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supranote 161, at 2156.
192.
In Janus CapitalGrp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the Supreme Court greatly narrowed
the scope of 10b-5 liability and held that only "the maker ofa statement" may be liable under Rule lOb5, and that a maker "is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it." 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). The Court's holding
may throw water on several of Professor Langevoort's five rules.
193.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supra note 161, at 2154; see also Black, supra
note 131, at 335 ("First, the public must have knowledge of the conduct that was deceptive, not
knowledge of the deception (since the latter would destroy reliance). Second, the defendant must be
publicly identified as a participant in the conduct.").
194.
See Affco Invs. 2001, LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 625 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2010); In re
Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121-24 (4th Cir. 2009).
195.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supranote 161, at 2154.
196.
Id. at 2154-55.
197.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161-62 (2008). Professor
Murdock observes, however, that the defendants were not engaged in an "ordinary course transaction,"
as buyers do not ordinarily pay twice as much as the supplier's product is worth. Charles W. Murdock,
Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the Economic Meltdown, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 801,
840 (2010).
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distinction is incoherent as accounting and financial reports are nothing
more than the quantitative expression of the results of business operations,
and indeed, the SEC could pursue a cause of action against the vendors. 198
Yet if Stoneridge is understood to say that a duty applies to those who
enjoy a professional status or expertise in the world of finance because
those persons appreciate the regulatory constraints and economic harm that
would follow from misinformation, then Stoneridge's distinction between
commerce and finance makes sense: more can reasonably be expected of
those in the latter category.' 99
This rule supports extending the presumption of reliance to new issues.
In new issues, the price is often set by the company and its underwriter.200
Underwriters, as hallmark finance professionals, understand the economic
harm that flows from fraud in the investment marketplace and they
uniquely appreciate regulatory constraints as they are charged specifically
with investigating registration statements.20 1 Investors should be able to
rely upon the underwriter, a hallmark finance professional, to set a price
undistorted by fraud.
Fourth, a third party owes a duty to an investor if the third party
actually helps engineer or design a deception, thereby making it more
likely to succeed.202 According to Langevoort, this rule explains
Stoneridge's emphasis on the fact that the vendors were only
"supernumeraries to [the company's] role as producer, director, and writer
of the fraud." 20 3 Langevoort's fifth rule similarly states that a third party
owes a duty to an investor if the third party has a sufficiently high form of
purpose or desire to deceive investors in the general marketplace. 20 4 If the
third party "throw[s] one's lot in" with the scheme, then the third party's
intent obviates any concern about disproportionality. 2 05 This rule supports
the fraud-created-the-market theory as well. Both this duty-based rule
Professor Langevoort derives and the fraud-created-the-the-market theory
focus on scienter that approaches specific intent. The fraud-created-the-

198.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supra note 161, at 2134.
199.
Id. at 2154-55. Professor Langevoort also points out that this rule provides room to extend
liability to licensed securities professionals, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers. Id. at 2155.
He notes though that lawyers' duties present special concerns "because of the special obligations of
zealous advocacy and confidentiality." Id.
See, e.g., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1994); Freeman v.
200.
Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 269 F.R.D. 252, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
See 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3)(A) (2006).
201.
202.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supra note 161, at 2155.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
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market theory is premised on the idea that defendants deliberately set out to
place securities on the market that had no business being there.
The fraud-created-the-market theory allows injured investors to
proceed via class action, a policy the Supreme Court specifically sought to
achieve in Affiliated Ute and Basic. Moreover, the presumption is
consistent with Professor Langevoort's Stoneridge-derived rules imposing
liability on those who appreciate the gravity of fraud in the marketplace
and set out to facilitate a market fraud.
V. THE SECURITIES LAWS, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE FRAUDCREATED-THE-MARKET PRESUMPTION

Not only is the fraud-created-the-market presumption grounded in the
Supreme Court's precedent, but it is also consistent with the securities laws
and the traditional common-law concerns of fairness and public policy that
justify judicial presumptions. This Part shows that the presumption, when
assessed in conjunction with its practical purpose, may be justified with
sufficient probability.2 06 This Part also shows that the presumption serves
sound public policy by promoting investor protection and market integrity,
encouraging accurate disclosure of material information, and balancing the
need to enforce the securities laws with concerns of overdeterrence. 207
A. The Confluence ofPolicy and Probability:The Bond Market and
Manipulative Conduct
The first hurdle the fraud-created-the-market theory must overcome is
probability. 208 The Third Circuit in Malack faulted the fraud-created-themarket theory on this basis, stating that unlike the fraud-on-the-market
theory, the fraud-created-the-market theory is unsupported by empirical
study or economic theory.20 9 When assessed in conjunction with the
practical need for a presumption of reliance to facilitate class-wide
resolution of securities fraud claims, however, the theory is supported by at
least minimal theoretical justification.
206.
See supra Part V.A.
207.
See supra Part V.B(l)-(3).
208.
Most presumptions have come into existence primarily because judges believe that proof of
fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to
assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 24,

§343.
209.
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 751-52 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Ross v. Bank
S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 738 (11th Cir. 1989) (Hill, J., concurring) ("The expression, 'fraud on an
undeveloped market' is a contradiction in terms. It may be translated as 'fraud on a nonexistent market.'
An undeveloped market is less than a twinkle in an issuer's eye. It says no more than 'an unwritten
book' or 'an uncomposed song."').
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First, although the probabilistic (or "theoretical" or "empirical")
support for a theory supports judicial recognition, the lack thereof by no
means bars crafting a presumption. Presumptions can and do exist under
the securities laws based on common sense alone. For example, Affiliated
Ute did not cite any empirical analysis or literature to support a
presumption of reliance in the case of an omission in the face of a duty to
disclose.210 The Supreme Court presumed reliance because common sense
dictates that to show reliance upon undisclosed information would be
impossible. 2 11 The presumed fact under the fraud-created-the-market theory
likewise is grounded in common sense. Under the fraud-created-the-market
theory, the market is used merely to determine that a given security is
worth more than zero dollars, a simple inquiry that seems to require about
as much empirical support as the presumption under Affiliated Ute.212
Second, theoretical support for a presumption under the securities laws
need not be and is not based on perfect science. For example, the fraud-onthe-market theory is universally accepted by federal courts.2 13 But the
premise of the fraud-on-the-market theory, the efficient-market hypothesis,
has been heavily criticized. Proponents of behavioral finance observe
irrationality in investor behavior and argue that markets are in the main
inefficient.2 14 One way in which behavioral finance scholars question the
efficient-market hypothesis is by pointing out that stock prices are
inconsistent with fundamental value; if the market were efficient and
publicly available information impounded in the stock price, then price
should provide an objective measure of value, but it doesn't. 2 15 Proponents
of behavioral finance also question the validity of the assumption that
mispricing does not exist in an efficient market because factors like
arbitrage, the demise of the irrational trader, and the cancellation of white
noise (or misinformed trading) correct any disparity in price.216 For
example, as a counter, behavioral finance scholars point to a range of
pricing anomalies and irrational individual behavior.2 17

210.
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972).
211.
Id.
212.
John Schmidt, Comment, The Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory: The Presumption of
Reliance in the PrimaryIssue Context, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 495, 528 (1991).
213.
See, e.g., Malack, 617 F.3d at 751-52 n.9.
214.
William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843 (2005); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 717 (2003).
215.
Dunbar & Heller, supra note 127, at 473-74.
216.
Id. at 474-76; Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
BehavioralApproach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 148-49 (2002); Lynn A. Stout,
The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introductionto the New Finance,28 J. CORP. L. 635, 65366 (2003).
217.
Dunbar & Heller, supra note 129, at 473-74.
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Yet even in light of these new criticisms, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its adherence to the fraud-on-the-market theory.218 Why, and
what then supports the presumption of reliance without probability? The
main focus of any presumption, and Affiliated Ute and Basic make this
clear, is policy. The presumptions are justified by the practical need for
class-wide reliance to meet the requirements of Rule 23. That there wasn't
a completely workable science in Affiliated Ute or Basic did not caution
against a legal presumption. Judges, with one or two exceptions, are not
scientists or economists. With a legal presumption, the Court aimed to
relieve judges from acting in this way and to overcome the procedural
problem posed by Rule 23 for Rule lOb-5 claims. 2 19 Legal presumptions
provide optimal deterrence and presumptions of reliance recognize that
prices are more likely to be correct, capital-allocation decisions likely to be
more accurate, and individual investment decisions likely better when full
information is provided to the market.220
Nevertheless, despite the subsidiary importance of probability, in some
cases, the fraud-created-the-market theory contains empirical and
theoretical support in two scenarios: (1) if the claim involves the primary
bond market; or (2) if the claim involves manipulative conduct. First, some
fraud-created-the-market cases deal with "informationally efficient"
markets. Some have argued that markets in the context of initial public
offerings, although rarely value efficient in that they often misprice
securities, can still be informationally efficient-the new market quickly
incorporates new information into a security's price. 2 2 1 A more compelling
case is made for the primary bond market, in which scholars remarked a
decade ago that "the primary market for newly issued bonds is more
informationally efficient than the secondary bond market."2 2 2 Fraudcreated-the-market cases commonly involve fraud in the primary bond

218.
Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011).
219.
Dunbar & Heller, supranote 127, at 457-58.
220.
Id. at 525-26.
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 21, § 13:32; Robert G. Newkirk, Comment, Sufficient
221.
Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393, 1394
(1991); see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 770-71 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Joseph De
Simone, Note, Should Fraudon the Market Theory Extend to the Context of Newly Issued Securities?
61 FORDHAM L. REV. S151, S177 (1993). The theory has, however, been criticized as ignoring the
literature on the underpricing of IPOs and being more applicable to the aftermarket for IPOs than the
offering itself. Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings
are Underpriced,41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 36 n.68 (1993). This underpricing may be intentionally built
into the price, however, as a way to reduce risk, avoid litigation, reward customers or attract new
business, or to encourage investors to bid up the price. Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock,
and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 649, 651-54 (2008).
Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U. L. REV.
222.
565, 579 (1995); see Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against FiduciaryDuties to CorporateStakeholders, 21
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27,48-49 (1996).
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market.223 A new market could be sufficiently "efficient" if there exists a
class of independent professional investors whose activities incorporate
significant public information about a security into a market price. 224 If a
buyer of that new security is defrauded, then all who purchased in the
initial public offering are defrauded.225 Because the market for newly
issued securities can be informationally efficient, a categorical rejection of
the fraud-created-the-market presumption casts too wide a net. Rather,
courts should first ask whether the market is informationally efficient, not
just liquid, similar to how courts require investors to show that a market is
efficient before invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory. Rejecting the
fraud-created-the-market theory categorically because it is inconsistent
with the efficient-market hypothesis leaves no room for evidence that the
market in that case was in actuality informationally efficient.226 Hence, at
least one district court has approached each suit case by case to determine
if there is a theoretical foundation. 2 2 7 Indeed, both Eckstein and Malack-in
which the courts rejected the fraud-created-the-market theory because it
had no empirical support-seem to implicitly recognize the possibility that
primary markets can be efficient. Both courts recognized that disclosure
would lower the market price.228 If disclosure would have affected the
price, then the fraud-created-the-market theory is indistinguishable from
the fraud-on-the-market theory.
Second, with respect to manipulation claims under Rule lOb-5(a) and
(c)-another common scenario in which plaintiffs invoke the fraudcreated-the-market theory 229-fraudulent schemes are more likely to have a
significant effect on prices in inefficient markets than in efficient markets,
thus making reliance premised on market efficiency nonsensical.2 30

See, e.g., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994); Freeman v.
223.
Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990); Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729 (11th
Cir. 1989) (en banc); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330,
1332 (10th Cir. 1983).
224.
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supranote 21, § 13:32; Newkirk, supranote 221, at 1394.
225.
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 21, § 13:32.
226.
In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.RD. 616, 641 (N.D. Ala. 2009).
Id.
227.
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 744, 750-51 (3d Cir. 2010).
228.
229.
See, e.g., Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 2009); Joseph v.
Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2000); Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 115455, 1158 (6th Cir. 1994); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988); Shores v.
Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1981); In re UBS Auction Rate Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2967
(LMM), 2010 WL 2541166, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010); In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp.
2d 304, 304, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Spyglass Capital Partners v. Kim, No. 4:07-CV-03478, 2008
WL 8082754, at *1-*2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11,2008).
230.
Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market Manipulation
Class Actions, 52 WM & MARY L. REv. 1111, 1118 (2011). Professor Roberta S. Karmel also implicitly
recognizes this point when she says:
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Professor Charles Korsmo shows that in the context of market
manipulation claims-by which he means profitable trades made with bad
intent, wash sales, and matched orders-the conditions for successful
market manipulation belie the need for an efficient market.231 In fact, he
concludes, manipulation is least likely to have an impact in efficient
markets.232 First, Professor Korsmo shows that manipulative trades in
inefficient markets can influence price by affecting the supply and demand
of a stock; and second, he demonstrates that manipulative trading can
influence price through information effects, like in Desai.233 Because the
market efficiency requirement perversely screens out valid manipulation
claims, he surmises, reliance premised on an efficient market is equally
incoherent.234
B. PublicPolicy, Fairness,and the JustifiableReliance Concernsof the
Presumption
The fraud-created-the-market theory is also consistent with the
securities laws and the common law concerns of public policy and fairness
that justify a judicially created presumption. Courts create presumptions
when fairness and public policy warrant them. 23 5 The ultimate goal or
policy aim of the securities laws is to protect investors from fraud and
promote the integrity of American markets. 23 6 The securities laws try to
achieve this goal by allowing investors to make autonomous investment
decisions, as opposed to paternalistically allowing the federal government
to advise the public on the merits of securities offerings. 23 7 Autonomous
investment decisions can only be made if investors have access to
information necessary to make an informed decision, and as a consequence,
the securities laws require those with the greatest degree of access to this
information to disclose it to the investing public. 2 38 Yet Congress also

While the fraud-on-the-market doctrine may have outlived its utility, its rejection by the
courts should not lead to the regulatory result that shareholders and investors cannot rely
upon the truth of an issuer's statements in SEC filings and similar documents. The SEC's
mandatory disclosure system depends upon fair and accurate financial disclosure by issuers.
They should not be let off the hook because the market for their securities is inefficient. It
may be inefficient, in part, because of their poor disclosures.
Karmel, supra note 176, at 52.
231.
Korsmo, supra note 230, at 1136-37, 1151-58.
232.
Id. at 1154.
233.
Id. at 1144-47.
234.
Id. at 1154.
236.

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supranote 24, § 343.
KAUFMAN, 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES, supranote 15,

237.
238.

Id.
Id.

235.
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wanted to avoid deterring honest and fruitful business practices, so
Congress required disclosure of only material facts.239 So, the goals of the
securities laws include: (1) promoting market integrity and protecting
investors; (2) encouraging accurate disclosure of material information; and
(3) balancing the need for enforcement with overdeterrence. This Part
shows that the fraud-created-the-market theory accomplishes all three.
1. PromotingInvestor Protectionand Market Integrity
Any presumption of reliance facilitates class-wide resolution of
securities fraud claims. The class-action device is vital to deterring
securities fraud and remedying its victims, who almost never suffer losses
sufficient to justify an individual suit. 24 0 The fraud-created-the-market
theory in particular protects a vulnerable group of investors and promotes
market integrity by allowing investors to recover through the class-action
device, promoting normative reliance on the SEC and other gatekeepers,
and supplementing SEC enforcement efforts.
To begin, the fraud-created-the-market theory protects a uniquely
susceptible group of investors and will likely have increased influence in
lawsuits regarding the subprime mortgage meltdown. The fraud-createdthe-market theory helps investors recover primarily in cases involving
internet fraud, including online initial public offerings and the bond market
on the Web.241 Online initial public offerings and sales of municipal bonds
are becoming more common, and unfortunately, internet securities fraud is
keeping pace.242 And "[a] significant portion of this fraud is the marketing
of securities that are patently worthless or complete shams."243 Internet
fraud usually victimizes "unsophisticated investors"-those trading without
the benefit of analyst evaluations or broker recommendations.2 44 In a
sophisticated, secondary market, investors rely upon informed experts.245

239.
Id.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
240.
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
241.
See Dennin, supra note 9, at 2651-52; SEC, Avoiding Internet Investment Scams: Tips for
Investors, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/scams.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (observing that
"[m]any online investment scams involve unregistered securities").
242.
See Dennin, supra note 9, at 2652-53; see also Laura S. Unger, Remarks at the Association
of Retired Persons National Legislative Council Annual Meeting, Investing in the Internet Age: What
You Should Know and What Your Computer May Not Tell You .. .(Feb. 3, 2000) (transcript available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch342.htm) (observing that the SEC has brought enforcement
actions against fraud actions "involving false [internet] offerings of everything from interests in eel
farms, coconut plantations, to even a new underwater city meant to be a Caribbean tax haven").
243.
Dennin, supranote 9, at 2652-53.
244.
See id.; Sachs, supra note 166, at 477.
245.
Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 137, at 108. "Verification is not an option for the
passive investor; checking the accuracy of a corporation's statements is a task that can be taken on only
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These investors thus have less incentive to determine whether a public
statement concerning an issue is misleading.246 In contrast, in a smaller
issue in a lesser developed market, where the level of analyst investigation
is lower and investors are less sophisticated, the investors are more at risk
and thus in need of more protection. 24 7 With the wide reach of internet
marketing, many investors can potentially be defrauded by fraudulent
initial offerings, and the fraud-created-the-market theory is well suited to
facilitate resolution of claims via the class action.24 8
In addition to protecting unsophisticated consumers, the theory may
play an increased role in protecting investors in suits against financial
institutions involved in the subprime mortgage debacle.249 In suits against
underwriters of auction rate securities, 2 50 for example, investors have
alleged that the products sold by banks were marketed as highly liquid
investments, but were in fact more akin to holding money in a money
market account. 2 5 1 But these purchasers will not be entitled to the fraud-onthe-market presumption because the fraudulent statements were made only
to a limited number of customers rather than to the market as a whole.m
The fraud-on-the-market presumption does not apply if the security at issue
is not traded on a developed market. 2 53 Thus, the fraud-created-the-market
theory may fill this gap.

by an investment professional, and even these sophisticated actors are unlikely to succeed in uncovering
fraud." Pritchard, supra note 138, at 223-24. Professor Pritchard though goes on to note that the best
way for a passive investor to protect against fraud is to diversify. Id. at 224.
246.
Newkirk, supra note 221, at 1419.
247.
See Langevoort, Half-Truths, supranote 137, at 117; Newkirk, supranote 221, at 1419.
248.
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 21, § 13:32 (2d ed. 2010); Dennin, supra note 9, at
2653.
249.
ROBERT R. LONG ET AL., Litigation Against FinancialInstitutions and Their Directors and
Officers in the Global Economic Crisis, in 27 ALSTON & BIRD LLP, SECURITIES LITIGATION FORMS &

ANALYSIS § 1:11 (2010). "Several distinct but interconnected shadow banking markets have emerged in
recent years, including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), auction-rate securities (ARS), hedge
funds, money market mutual funds (MMMF), repurchase agreements (repos), and credit derivatives like
credit default swaps (CDS) and total return swaps (TRS)." Adam J. Levitin, In Defense ofBailouts, 99
GEO. L.J. 435, 464-65 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
250.
Auction rate securities are long-term corporate or municipal bonds with interests rates that
are periodically reset through an auction (a "Dutch" auction) in which bids with successively higher
rates are accepted until all the securities in the auction are sold. Brendan P. Tracy, Note, Iflt 's Broken,
Sometimes It Can't Be Fixed: Why the Auction Rate Securities Market Was Faultyfrom Its Inception
and How Broker-Dealers CausedIts Downfall, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 297, 297-98 (2010).
"Frequent issuers of municipal ARS include traditional issuers of tax-exempt debt such as
municipalities, nonprofit hospitals, utilities, housing finance agencies, student loan finance authorities
and universities." DOUGLAS SKARR, CDIAC POLICY RESEARCH UNIT, ISSUE BRIEF: AUCTION RATE
SECURITIES 1 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/issuebriefs/aug04.pdf.
251.
LONG ET AL., supranote 249, § 1:11.
Id.
252.
253.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n. 27 (1975) (listing as an element of the
presumption as "that the shares were traded on an efficient market").
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That the fraud-created-the-market presumption protects unsophisticated
investors makes a normative presumption even more appropriate. 25 4
Affiliated Ute communicated that investors should be able to rely on those
who owe them fiduciary duties, and Basic communicated that investors
should be able to rely on the integrity of the stock price. 2 55 The fraudcreated-the-market theory posits that investors should be able to rely on
market gatekeepers, like underwriters or the SEC, to keep patently
worthless securities off the market.256 Critics contend, erroneously
however, that this reliance on the regulation of the market is unreasonable
because gatekeepers do not guard against fraud or vouch for the substantive
value of a security or an issuer's representations.2 57
With respect to the SEC, although the agency does not analyze the
258
value of securities offered or the veracity of the issuer's representations,
the truthfulness of a representation is distinct from whether an offering
adheres to the requirements of state and federal law.259 In this way, the
fraud-created-the-market theory, when premised on legal unmarketability
at least, represents a tradeoff between a securities regulation regime that
focuses on full disclosure and "rewarding plaintiffs who fail to avail
themselves of those disclosures." 2 6 0 And even though the SEC cannot

See Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 137, at 108 (observing that if unsophisticated
254.
investors are more at risk of fraud, a presumption is more appropriate).
255.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 23, at 160-61, 165; Rosefelt, supranote 46, at 358;
Note, Securities Law-Fraud-on-the-Market-FirstCircuit Defines an Efficient Marketfor Fraud-onthe-Market Purposes, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2284, 2290 (2006).
256.
T.J. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir.
1983). Regardless whether the SEC vouches for the accuracy or validity of market disclosures, the SEC
is nevertheless a lightning rod for criticism when it fails to uncover fraud. See, e.g., Murdock, Why Not
Tell the Truth?, supra note 197, at 871 (stating that the SEC's relaxed enforcement is a major factor in
the present economic crisis); see also Marcy Gordon, SEC Enforcement ChiefLinda Thomsen Resigns,
POLITIcO, Feb. 9, 2009, http://dyn.politico.com/members/forums/thread.cfm?catid=1&subcatid=2
&threadid=2030791 (stating that the SEC Commission was a lightning rod of criticism when the SEC
failed to detect Bernard Madoff's fifty billion dollar Ponzi scheme despite red flags raised by outsiders
over the course of a decade); Nicholas Rummell, Tumble in Restatements Sparks Criticism of SEC,
FINANCIALWEEK (Aug. 25, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.financialweek.com/article/20080825/
REG/860815 (stating that a steep decline in restatements and material weaknesses in 2008 was more to
do with a sleepier securities watchdog than with compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxicy Act).
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 750 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010); Desai v. Deutsche
257.
Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring); Joseph v. Wiles, 223
F.3d 1155, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000); Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1994);
Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 739-40 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring); Camden Asset
Mgmt. v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 99-CV-8275, 2001 WL 34556527, at *38 n.9 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001).
258.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(b)(7) (2011) (stating that if an SEC legend is needed on a
registration statement or prospectus, then the document must state that the SEC has not approved or
disapproved of the securities or passed on the accuracy of the disclosures).
259.
Bruce D. Cohen, Note, Dredging the Shores Doctrine: Trends in the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory in the New Issues Context, 23 GA. L. REv. 731, 760 (1989).
In exchange for barring investors who fail to read offering documents from recovery,
260.
defendants must comply with the law. Cohen, supra note 259, at 760.
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reasonably be expected to conduct a merits review of every offering
document, the agency's examination of registration statements and its use
of orders refusing to permit registration or stop orders when uncorrected
misrepresentations appear nevertheless have the practical effect of limiting
more flagrant misstatements and omissions.261
Permitting reliance on underwriters is less problematic than reliance on
the SEC. The securities laws require underwriters to perform a reasonable
investigation and form a reasonable belief that the registration statement is
accurate.262 Ergo, investors should be permitted more confidence in an
underwriter with an established reputation for fair dealing. 2 6 3 Similarly,
gatekeepers, like auditors, exist to lend reputational capital to the offering
and assure investors that they will not be sold "lemons." 26 The presence of
these gatekeepers also makes the "unmarketability" standard workable.
Critics of the fraud-created-the-market theory contend that the economic
unmarketability standard is unworkable because the price of any security
can be lowered until it is unmarketable. 2 65 But as a practical matter, the
underwriter and issuer who coordinate the offering incur "substantial legal,
accounting, and registration fees," as well as other transactions costs that
provide a floor for the price of the security.266 Therefore, the securities
would have to be marketed at an initial price high enough to justify the
underwriter's involvement.267 As Chief Judge Easterbrook has recognized,
"[t]he self-interest of those who seek to maintain reputations for honest
dealing, and the legal rules against fraud, are the primary guarantors of the
accuracy of representations in securities transactions."26 8
The fraud-created-the-market presumption also fosters market integrity
by providing for holistic enforcement of the securities laws. Rejecting the
fraud-created-the-market theory because the SEC does not screen for fraud
is incoherent and inconsistent with the lOb-5 private right of action. If the
SEC cannot protect investors against this fraud in newly issued securities,
then why does Section 10(b) deny investors a remedy? The Supreme Court
261.
In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 643 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (quoting Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 566-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)). The SEC can refuse
to allow a registration statement to become effective until it has been amended in conformity with the
SEC's wishes and issue stop orders preventing registration statements from becoming effective if they
contain untrue statements or material omissions. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b), (d) (2006).
262.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (2006); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 352-53 (2006).

263.
In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. at 643-44 (quoting Feit, 332 F. Supp. 2d at
581-82).
264.
COFFEE, supra note 262, at 2-3; Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV.
1583, 1595-96(2010).
265.
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1993).
266.
Case Note, supra note 43, at 1174.
267.
Id.
268.
Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1985).
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constantly justifies the private right of action under Rule 1Ob-5 as a
supplement to the enforcement efforts of the SEC. 2 69 The fraud-created-themarket theory thus provides a deterrent through threat of litigation to help
the SEC prevent this kind of fraud.
2. EncouragingAccurate Disclosure
Critics of the fraud-created-the-market theory contend that the
presumption is inconsistent with the securities laws' purpose of
encouraging complete disclosure of accurate information.270 Investors who
buy or sell thinly-traded securities in the absence of an efficient market
should read offering documents, and their failure to do so, critics argue,
makes their reliance unreasonable. 2 7 1 A presumption of reliance where
investors fail to read offering documents, critics worry, would create
passive and potentially negligent investors who fail to read any offering
documents.272 But this criticism misunderstands the disclosure goal of the
securities laws and places undue weight on the investors' failure to read
offering documents.
The securities laws protect investors by penalizing defendants for
shirking their disclosure obligations, rather than penalizing investors for
failing to investigate.273 (Indeed, several federal courts of appeals have
rightly rejected as a defense investors' failure to exercise due diligence.) 2 74
The securities laws recognize that disclosure and investigation are
cumulative ways of getting at the truth and that investigating facts already
known to the defendant is a wasteful duplication of effort.27 5 Barring
investors from recovery because they did not read offering documents-an

269.
See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) ("[P]rivate
actions . . . are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought,
respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .").
270.
See, e.g., Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 743 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring);
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting); Herzog, supra note 118,
at 395-97; John M. Hynes, Comment, The Unjustified Presumption of Reliance for Newly Issued
Securities: Why the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Rang the Death Knell for the
Fraud-Created-the-MarketTheory, 38 Sw. L. REV. 333, 353-54 (2008).
271.
See, e.g., Ross, 885 F.2d at 738 (Tjoflat, J., concurring); Camden Asset Mgmt. v. Sunbeam
Corp., No. 99-CV-8275, 2001 WL 34556527, at *11 n.9 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001). This is the ultimate
reason why Professor Langevoort rejects the fraud-created-the-market theory. Langevoort, Basic at
Twenty, supra note 23, at 171.
272.
See, e.g., Shores, 647 F.2d at 473, 483 (Randall, J., dissenting); Herzog, supra note 118, at
395-96.
273.
274.

KAUFMAN, 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES, supranote 15, § 1:3.
JOSEPH C. LONG, 12A BLUE SKY LAW (SECURITIES LAW SERIES)

§

9:133 (2010);

BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 32, § 7:453; Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v.
Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Mercury Air Grp., Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542,
546 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring plaintiffs to establish due diligence).
275.
Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 762 F.2d at 526-27.
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approach akin to contributory negligence-does not give the seller's
obligation to tell the truth the primacy that obligation must have.276
And although justifiable reliance is an element of common-law
fraud,2 77 the Restatement of Torts recognizes that the recipient of a
fraudulent statement is still justified in relying upon its truth even though
the recipient may have discovered the statement's falsity through
investigation.278 Moreover, to the extent fraud under Rule 10b-5 is
incommensurable with common-law fraud, this difference is because
common-law fraud is too restrictive of a remedy for modem frauds.279
More to the point, Rule 1Ob-5 condemns only fraud made with scienter,
which subsumes any due diligence defense. 2 80 And emphasis on the
defendants' scienter is even more pronounced in fraud-created-the-market
cases where investors must show that the defendants knew or reasonably
should have known that the securities would not have been marketed if the
truth had been known.281 Because of the scienter element, fraud under the
fraud-created-the-market theory is more akin to an intentional tort, and the
plaintiffs contributory negligence was never a defense to an intentional
tort under common-law fraud.282
Even still, it is unclear why reading offering documents matters in a
case properly invoking the fraud-created-the-market theory. The essence of
the fraud-created-the-market theory is that the defendants committed a very
egregious fraud: persons seek to perpetrate complete frauds and bring
otherwise worthless securities to market that have no business being
there.2 83 Full disclosure is irrelevant to these persons because they are
intent on misrepresenting the securities to the public and attempting to
284
persuade investors to buy them.
Not only is disclosure irrelevant to those committing the fraud, but also
a judicial rule requiring investors to read offering documents to maintain a

276.

See id. at 527-28.

277.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 537

(1977).

278.
Id. § 540.
279.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 173 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988); Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-389 (1983).
280.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2007); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); see also Karmel, supra note 176, at 53 (recognizing that due
diligence as a defense under Rule l0b-5 is subsumed by the scienter requirement).
281.
Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729 (1lth Cir. 1989); Herzog, supra note 118, at 377;
Sachs, supra note 166, at 481.
282.
Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Principles to
Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R. 525 (5th ed. 1994); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 481, 482
(1965).
283.
Dennin, supra note 9, at 2649.
284.
Id.
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fraud claim does not influence investor behavior. 2 8 5 "Investors read
disclosure documents in order to assess the riskiness of the venture, not to
preserve possible fraud claims." 2 8 6 Prohibiting investors from recovering
for failing to read offering documents "does not insulate investors from
losses resulting from nonfraudulently issued securities," and so their
"incentive to gather information about risk remains." 287 Moreover, because
the fraud-created-the-market theory applies only to securities that are
worthless, investors are still motivated to read disclosure materials to
ensure that they nevertheless do not buy overvalued, although not
worthless, securities.288 In other words, investors are still motivated to read
offering documents to ensure that they do not overpay.
Requiring investors to read offering documents, even though
defendants were obligated to tell the truth, means that investors must
investigate what the other party says, despite the fact that the defendant has
the best access to pertinent information and can reveal it at low cost. 28 9 And
even though the less-widely distributed the investment, the more valuable
any one investigation, many potential investors would have to undertake
individual, costly investigations on every offering. But most important,
courts should not "wink at the falsehoods or omissions of the sellers of the
securities" and force investors to resort to "the costly self-help approach of
investigations on pain of losing the protection of the principal legal
safeguard, the rule against fraud." 2 9 0
3. BalancingEnforcement of the Securities Laws with Overdeterrence
The securities laws seek a delicate balance between deterring fraud and
promoting legitimate market activity. 291 A subtext of many criticisms of the
fraud-created-the-market theory is that it expands liability under Rule 1Ob5. These critics assert that the presumption provides duplicative remedies
under Section 10(b) and Section 18 of the 1934 Act 2 92 and that it extends
liability inconsistent with the Supreme Court and Congress's trend of
cabining the scope of Rule 1Ob-5.293 But the theory neither inappropriately
usurps Section 18 nor expands liability under Rule lob-5.

285.
Case Note, supranote 43, at 1173.
286.
Id.
287.
Id.
288.
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981); Schmidt, supra note 212, at 521.
289.
Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1985).
290.
Id. at 527-28.
291.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
292.
Herzog, supra note 118, at 398-99.
293.
See Shores, 647 F.2d at 473 (Randall, J., dissenting) (stating that the fraud-created-themarket presumption would open the floodgates and prolong frivolous litigation).
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Section 18 provides that any person who makes or causes to be made a
materially false or misleading statement to be filed with the SEC shall be
liable to any person who relied upon this statement in buying or selling a
security at a price that was affected by the statement. 294 Section 18 requires
actual "eyeball" reliance.295 Section 18, however, is not an exclusive
remedy for false documents filed with the SEC.296 And even if it were, the
Supreme Court has held that investors can pursue duplicative remedies
under the securities laws. 297 Moreover, the fraud-created-the-market theory
reaches private but highly liquid markets that Section 18 misses. For
example, the markets to invest in Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedln, which
are so liquid that many have argued that they need not go public at all, 29 8
are not subject to many SEC filing requirements, which has caused the
agency to take a closer look at the trading. 299 Should fraud arise in a market
like this, Section 18 would not apply, but Rule lOb-5 and a presumption of
reliance under the fraud-created-the-market theory might.
Critics also contend that the fraud-created-the-market theory is an
unwarranted extension of securities fraud liability inconsistent with the
Supreme Court and Congress's trend of limiting liability under Rule
lOb-5. 3 00 We agree that many of the Court's lOb-5 decisions since 1975
have restricted the range of conduct that will result in liability. 30 1 Congress

294.
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006). To establish a prima facie case under section 18, investors must
show (1) the purchase or sale of a security (2) in reliance upon (3) a materially misleading report filed
under the 1934 Act (4) at a price affected by the misleading report (5) from which damages caused by
the reliance flowed. Deephaven Private Placement Trading, Ltd. v. Grant Thornton & Co., 454 F.3d
1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006).
295.
Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968). Section 18 also differs from Rule 1Ob-5
because section 18 allows investors to recover litigation costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 15
U.S.C. §78r(a).
296.
Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 556 (2d Cir. 1979); see also HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3A SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW (SECURITIES LAW

SERIES) §7:64 (2d ed. 2010).
297.
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983).
298.
See, e.g., Nick O'Neill, Who Needs a Public Market When Facebook Shares are This
Liquid?, ALL FACEBOOK (Nov. 19, 2010, 5:49 PM), http://www.allfacebook.com/who-needs-a-publicmarket-when-facebook-shares-are-this-liquid-2010-ll; Joel Schectman, Facebook s Shadow Stock
Market, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 6, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/01/06/
buying-facebook-stock-on-the-shadow-market.html.
299.
See, e.g., Sajid Farooq, SEC Looking Into Private Sales of Faceboook, Twitter, Zynga
Shares, NBC BAY AREA (Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/tech/SEC-Looking-IntoPrivate-Sales-of-Facebook-Twitter-Zynga-Shares-112558989.html; Peter Lattman, Stock Trading in
Private Companies Draws S.E.C. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2010, 10:06 PM), http://dealbook.ny
times.com/2010/12/27/stock-trading-in-private-companies-draws-scrutiny/.
300.
See Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (6th Cir. 1994); Shores v.
Skylar, 647 F.2d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting) (stating that the fraud-created-themarket presumption would open the floodgates and prolong frivolous litigation); Herzog, supra note
118, at 394.
301.
Much of the Supreme Court's securities fraud jurisprudence since Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores has been consistent in only that regard. Michael J. Kaufman, Mending the
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likewise passed the PSLRA (and its sister statute, the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 to keep securities fraud class actions out of
state court), 302 which imposed a heightened pleading standard, stayed
discovery pending a motion to dismiss, and altered rules for joint and
several liability. 3 03 And repeatedly in Senate and House reports,
Congressmen expressed concerns with "frivolous" securities litigation. 30 4
Even the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in the wake of the colossal
Enron scandal, did not extend private rights of action for investors.305 The
recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has
similarly failed to enact proposals that would have reinstated lob-5 as a
basis for liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud.306
Weathered JurisdictionalFences in the Supreme Court's Securities FraudDecisions, 49 SMU L. REV.
159, 183-84 (1996). Many of the Court's recent decisions also continue this trend. In In Janus Capital
Group, Inc. v. FirstDerivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011), the Court limited 10b-5 liability
to only "the maker of a statement" "with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it." In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2884 (2010), the said that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 reaches only purchases or sales of a security in
the United States or purchases or sales of a security listed on an American stock exchange. The result is
that the Court has "expanded jurisdiction for foreign shareholders and narrowed it for US shareholders"
because foreign shareholders can now bring a IOb-5 claim if a foreign company trades its shares on the
New York Stock Exchange but American shareholders injured by fraud that occurs in the U.S. cannot
sue if the company is traded on the Bulletin Board or anywhere else on the OTC market and the shares
are bought overseas in a private placement. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Morrison v. National Australia Bank:
ProtectingForeign Shareholdersand DiscouragingListings on the NYSE, RACE TO THE BOTTOM (June
24, 2010), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/morrison-v-national-australia-bankprotecting-foreign-shareh.html. In Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 159-64 (2008), the Court rejected scheme liability, in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322-23 (2007), the Court heightened the pleading standard by requiring district courts to
weigh both culpable and nonculpable inferences of scienter at the motion to dismiss stage, and in Dura
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-44 (2005), the Court held that plaintiffs cannot
plead loss causation by alleging that the price of the security on the date of purchase was inflated
because of the misrepresentation.
302.
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
303.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(l)-(2), (b)(3)(B), (f) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1, 15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4-6, 8-9, 14, as
304.
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683-85, 687-88, 693; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31-32, 37, 39
(1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730-31, 736, 738.
305.
SOX did have several effects on corporate governance, however, requiring principal,
executive officers to certify that certain reports contained no false or misleading information, SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §302, 116 Stat. 745, 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)
(2006); providing criminal penalties if the CEO knowingly certified false information, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 §906 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2006)); and mandating that each annual report filed
by a company contain a report on internal controls established to guard against fraud, Sarbanes-Oxlcy
Act of 2002 §404 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7262(a)-(b) (2006)).
306.
Senator Arlen Spector introduced legislation-the Liability for Aiding and Abetting
Securities Violations Act of 2009-that would have authorized securities actions against any person
that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another in violation of the federal
securities laws. The proposed legislation had CentralBank and Stoneridge in its crosshairs:
PRIVATE CIVIL ACTIONs.-For purposes of any private civil action implied under this title,
any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in
violation of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to
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But the fraud-created-the-market theory does not expand 1Ob-5 liability
at all. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) forbid market manipulation
already. 307 Rather, underlying the criticism that the fraud-created-themarket theory expands lOb-5 liability is the idea that by establishing
reliance, investors' recovery is virtually assured. The court in Malack hints
at this when it says: "the presumption of reliance is a powerful tool for
plaintiffs seeking class certification and class certification puts pressure on
defendants to settle claims, even if they are frivolous."30 8
The concern that once a class is certified defendants are forced to settle
cases in terrorem, however, is already addressed in the securities laws,
speculative, and one-sided. 3 09 First, a litany of safeguards exists that protect
defendants in securities fraud cases. For example, investors must satisfy the
rigorous pleading requirements under the PSLRA,3 10 which has proved an
especially good defense after Tellabs.3 11 Indeed, in the recent wave of
subprime securities class actions, defendants have been most successful
arguing that plaintiffs have failed to establish the strong inference of
fraudulent intent.3t 2 Frivolous claims are further addressed by the enhanced
Rule 11 provisions and the stay of discovery pending any 12(b)(6) litmus
Second, as Professor Arthur R. Miller notes,
test under the PSLRA.

be in violation of this title to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is
provided.
The Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111 th Cong. §§ 1-2
(2009). Senator Christopher Dodd introduced the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010,
which would have similarly amended the 1934 Act and overruled Central Bank and Stoneridge,
allowing plaintiffs to pursue secondary liability claims. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of
2010, 111th Cong. §984 (2010).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (prohibiting "any manipulative or deceptive
307.
device") (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2011); see Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of
Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1975).
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 755 (3d Cir. 2010). The federal courts echo
308.
this sentiment in the context of all reliance presumptions, not just the fraud-created-the-market theory.
See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266-67 (5th Cir.
2007); Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2005); Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366
F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2004).
309.
For a fuller criticism of the in terrorem rationale, see generally Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy,
Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV.
681 (2005); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The JudicialAccess Barriersto Remedies for
Securities Fraud,75 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 55 (2012); Miller, supra note 7; Charles Silver, "We're
Scared to Death": Class Certificationand Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
Scienter as a stopgap may be problematic, however, in that almost all claims are directed at
310.
companies and other legal fictions, not persons, and corporate scienter is "admittedly fuzzy."
See Langevoort,Reading Stoneridge Carefully,supra note 161, at 2146.
311.
John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd: The Weighing Game, 39
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 689-90 (2008).
LONG ET AL., supra note 249, § 1:11.
312.
313.
15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3), (c)(l)-(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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much is unknown about litigation costs. 3 14 For instance, although litigants
face significant costs, we do not know the extent of these costs; whether
they are overstated, self-inflicted, or aberrational; whether cost is
attributable to frivolous or merited litigation; or whether costs of discovery
are influenced by procedural rules, and if so which ones and by how
much. 3 15 Third, the in terrorem concern is one-sided in that it fails to
account for costs borne by investors, by the judicial system, and to society
from resulting underenforcement of the securities laws. 316 Hence, without
further study, this in terrorem concern simply has no place when analyzing
the propriety of the fraud-created-the-market presumption.
VI. CONCLUSION

The fraud-created-the-market theory presumes reliance when a
defendant's fraud is so egregious that it places securities on the market that
have no business being there. The federal courts that have rejected the
theory by relying upon Stoneridge have misread that decision, ignored the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence that makes the materiality of any
misstatement or omission the primacy of any Rule 10b-5 case, and
misconstrued the fraud-created-the-market theory. The fraud-created-themarket theory is supported by probability, sound public policy, and
fairness. Investors should be able to rely on a security's presence on the
market as minimum assurance that the security has business being there.
This reliance is justified, and a presumption of reliance promotes investor
protection.

Miller, supra note 7, at 61-64; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class
314.
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 n.5 (2006)
(noting that the true "strike suit" is "a beast like the unicorn, more discussed than directly observed").
Miller, supra note 7, at 62-63; see also Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement
315.
"Problem": The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 234-38
(2007).
Miller,supra note 7, at 61.
316.
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